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Western Business Opportunities in the Soviet Union:
Perestroikan Prospects
Leif Weizman*
I. Introduction
The many pieces of legislation' adopted as part of President
Mikhail S. Gorbachev's economic reform, known as perestroika,2 are
designed to stimulate Western investments in the Soviet economy.
While perestroika is a major shift in Soviet policy and attitude towards
the West, some still question the profit making potential in a cen-
trally planned economy that is founded on the principles of mandat-
ing state ownership as a means of production,3 prohibiting the use of
hired labor, and rejecting the concept of profit as an incentive for
efficiency. 4 Until recently, the Soviet Union regarded foreign trade
as a necessary evil; Soviet enterprises only imported products that
were not produced domestically. 5 To prevent the negative economic
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bright Scholar at the University of Miami School of Law (LL.M.) and School of Business
(M.S.T.); admitted to the Danish Bar in 1985 and to the High Court of Denmark in 1987.
1 For an overview of the glasnost and perestroika legislation, see Kraus, Soviet Reforms,
1985-1988: An Overview, 1 GLOBAL ECON. POL'Y 12 (1989).
2 See generally M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROiKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND
THE WORLD (1987). For a discussion of measuring the economic success or failure ofper-
estroika, see E. HEWETT, REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMY: ECONOMY VERSUS EFFICIENCY
365-91 (1988). See also Allison, Testing Gorbachev, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 18 (1988); Balassa, Con-
ditions for Perestroika to Succeed, 1 GLOBAL ECON. POL'Y 24 (1989); Rogers, Glasnost and Per-
estroika: An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution and Its Opportunities for the West, 16 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 209 (1988). For a critical evaluation ofperestroika, see Osakwe, The Death of
Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy: A Clinical Examination of the SovietJoint Venture Law of
1987, 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1989) ("[PJerestroika is a blueprint for disaster from
the best intentions.").
3 See KONST. SSR art. II. For a discussion of the constitutional requirement of state-
owned industry and its relation to foreign joint venture participation, see Dunn, The New
Soviet Joint Venture Regulations, 12 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 175-77 (1987).
4 See Ioffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 1592-94 (1982). For
background on past Soviet leaders' attitudes towards material incentives to increase pro-
ductivity, see Armstrong, Private Enterprises in a Planned Economy: Implementation and Nullifica-
tion of Soviet Law, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49, 50-52 (1983).
5 Soviet enterprises have traditionally been prohibited from importing products,
even if not domestically available, unless they could show the country could not produce
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effects of importing, exports were allowed only to the extent of im-
ports. 6 Because import and export transactions were handled exclu-
sively by state controlled foreign trade organizations (FTOs), foreign
companies could not trade directly with Soviet enterprises or con-
sumers. 7 Joint ventures between Western and Soviet enterprises
were prohibited. In 1987, the Soviet Union undoubtedly shifted its
policy towards foreign trade by adopting the joint venture legislation
and limiting the foreign trade monopoly.8 However, the Soviet eco-
nomic system, based on state control and central planning (Gosplan),9
remained largely unchanged, thereby causing legitimate concern
among foreign investors. On December 2, 1988, the Council of Min-
isters adopted legislation that introduced considerable changes to
the Soviet economic system.' 0 Although the legislation was enacted
or develop such products. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Trade lobbied for nine
years before gaining permission in 1981 to negotiate the purchase of Western technology
for the manufacture of tractors. H. GARDNER, SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: THE DECISION PRO-
CESS 137 (1983).
6 As part of foreign trade planning, the State Planning Committee compiles "control
figures" and forwards 'them to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. After these figures pass
through the Ministry hierarchy, the Ministry prepares an annual export-import plan and
sends it to the State Planning Committee. The final export-import plan must meet ap-
proval by the Council of Ministers and becomes law after confirmation by the Supreme
Soviet. Id. at 8-9.
7 Id. at 62-67.
8 Joint ventures were, however, already allowed in most other Eastern European
countries, including Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulga-
ria. See generally Brank, Perestroika in Eastern Europe: Four New Joint Venture Laws in 1989, 21
LAW & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 1 (1989); Buzescu,Joint-Ventures in Eastern Europe, 32 AM. J. COMp.
L. 407 (1984); Scriven,Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 633 (1980). For sources on joint ventures in Hungary, see Eichmann,Joint Ven-
tures in Hungary: A Model for Socialist States?, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257 (1988); Borg &
Lafeber, Joint Ventures. in Hungary, 13 REV. SOCIALIST L. 317 (1987). For sources on joint
ventures in Yugoslavia, see Comment, Yugoslavia: Law on Foreign Investments, 28 I.L.M. 1543
(1989); Artisien & Buckley,Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: Comment, 18J. WORLD TRADE L. 163
(1984). For sources on joint ventures in Romania, see Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in
Eastern Europe.- Problems and Prospects of Romania'sJoint Venture Legislation, 6 LAw & POL'y Icr'L
Bus. 1059 (1974); Morse & GoekjianJoint Investment Opportunities with the Socialist Republic of
Romania, 29 Bus. LAw. 133 (1973). For sources on joint ventures in Poland, see Burzynski,
The Polish Law of 1986 on Joint Ventures, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Jodach, Ownership and
Investment in Poland, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63 (1985). For a source on joint ventures in
Czechoslovakia, see Bakes, Czechoslovakia: Joint Ventures, 29 EUR. TAX'N 88 (1989). For a
source on joint ventures in Bulgaria, see Liebman & McCrae, Joint Ventures in Bulgaria, 14
DROIT ET PRACTIQUE DU COMMERCE Ir'L 797 (1988).
9 The Soviet economic system is divided generally among three categories of agen-
cies, all subordinate to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers: 1) physical plan-
ning agencies, including, the Science and Technology State Committee, State Supply
Committee (Gossnab), State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and State Price Committee;
2) financial planning agencies, including the Finance Ministry and State Bank (Gosbank), the
latter controlling the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtogbank); and 3) operative agencies, includ-
ing the Ministry of Foreign Trade, State Committee for Foreign Relations, Industrial Min-
istries, and FTOs not affiliated with specific operating agencies. These agencies
coordinate economic activity by means of various annual and five-year central economic
plans. H. GARDNER, supra note 5, at 1-15.
10 Hungary has gone even further by becoming the first socialist European country to
adopt a uniform code governing all forms of enterprises (general and limited partnerships,
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in response to Western criticism, many questions of great concern to
foreign investors have remained unanswered.
II. The Soviet Business Environment
Until the 1970s Soviet central planners considered foreign mar-
kets to be uncontrollable, and they avoided foreign trade whenever
possible. " I Factories were rewarded on the basis of the quantity pro-
duced, leaving factories and employees without incentive to meet the
qualitative' demands of foreign markets. Soviet consumers, who
feared that an open economy would lead to unemployment and infla-
tion, rejected integration into the world market. 12 Domestic enter-
prises were able to import products that could not be produced
domestically.' 3 Exports were needed to obtain foreign currency to
pay for imports. All foreign trade transactions were made at con-
trolled prices through foreign trade organizations (FTOs), and
under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.' 4
The trend toward integration into the world market began in the
late 1960s after several years of trade deficit. In 1967, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade created the network of export councils to promote
communication between the industrial ministries and the FTOs on
matters of export and production. 15 One year later, the industrial
ministries established associations to promote exports. 16 These as-
sociations were allowed to participate directly in promoting exports,
but were unable to engage in transactions with foreign companies. 17
In the 1970s, several proposals were made to decentralize foreign
trade,' 8 and in 1978, export and import enterprises were created
limited liability companies, and joint-stock corporations) and by allowing foreigners mi-
nority participation without special permission. See Hungary: Memorandum of the Hungarian
Chamber of Commerce, 29 EUR. TAX!N 125, 125 (1989).
1I The traditional Soviet aversion to foreign trade may have resulted from both a fear
of dependence on the world market and a belief that the Soviet central planning process
could not include international market values. H. GARDNER, supra note 5, at 137.
12 For discussions of Soviet and Western perceptions of each other before and after
perestroika, see Yankelovich, Listening to the Public, in PERESTROIKA PAPERS: AN EXERCISE IN
SUPPLEMENTARY DIPLOMACY 110-31 (Kingston ed. 1988).
13 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14 Though FTOs are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, they enjoy independent legal status and operate on the basis of "economic ac-
countability," known as khozraschet. See 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYS-
TEm: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 115-33 (1987). For more complete discussions of the FTOs' role
in the Soviet economic system, see generally J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MO-
NOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAws (1974); Butler, The State Monopoly of Foreign Trade and the
Family of Socialist Legal Systems, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 215 (1987); Shillinglaw & Stein, Doing
Business in the Soviet Union, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 3-18 (1981).
15 H. GARDNER, supra note 5, at 73.
16 Id. at 73-74.
17 Id. at 74.
18 The three most important features of this reorganization were the following: 1)
FTOs were allowed to operate on a basis of khozraschet; 2) a Board of Directors was estab-
lished for each FTO, with equal representation from industry and the Ministry of Foreign
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
within the FTOs to handle transactions regarding specific prod-
ucts. 19 To create closer contact between the FTOs and Soviet enter-
prises, the FTOs were placed under Boards of Directors with equal
representation from the industrial ministries and the Ministry of For-
eign Trade. 20 However, as nothing was done to create a closer con-
tact between Soviet enterprises and foreign companies, the state
trading monopoly remained largely unchanged. In 1986 the Central
Committee and the Council of Ministers agreed to reform the for-
eign trade system by allowing agencies and enterprises to engage
independently in foreign trade.2 1 The State Foreign Economic
Commission was formed to regulate and coordinate closer contact
between ministries and agencies engaged in foreign trade.22 While
the agencies are eager to establish FTOs, enterprises show little in-
terest.2 3 Therefore, most Soviet enterprises are still handled
through FTOs under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and other
agencies.
Recognizing that more than eighty percent of world trade is con-
ducted within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),24 in 1986 the Soviet Union made inquiries into joining the
GAT, and submitted a petition requesting that the Soviet Union be
given observer status at the 1986 Uruguay Round. 25 The Soviets ar-
gued that their participation in GAIT was appropriate since they
were part of an interdependent world economy.2 6 The petition was
rejected, and subsequent Soviet proposals for accession to the
GATT have been rejected. GATT membership would enhance the
Soviet world trade position, which is crucial to its economic stability
in light of the drop in oil and gas prices. 27 The United States op-
Trade; and 3) the foreign trade offices of the FFOs were transformed into firms with
greater responsibilities. Id. at 68-70.
19 Smirnov, Legal Status of a Foreign Trade Association, FOREIGN TRADE (No. 10) 38, 38
(1978).
20 Although the Boards of Directors apparently play a direct role in the management
of the FFO, the General Director exercises great control over the Fro. Shillinglaw &
Stein, supra note 14, at 6-7.
21 Butler, Introductory Note to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Decree on Joint Enterprises
with Western and Developing Countries, 26 .LM. 749, 749 (1986).
22 See Butler, Legal Reform in the Soviet Union, HARRIMAN INST. F., Sep. 1988, at 1, 6.
23 Gardner, Restructuring the Soviet Foreign Trade System, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.,
Summer 1988, at 7, 9.
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
(5), (6), T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, as amended, reprinted in I GATT BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 13 (1952).
25 See Note, Soviet "Participation" in GATT A Casefor Accession, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 477, 477-78 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Soviet Participation].
26 See Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L., Apr.
1987, at 23, 24. The Soviet Union and China are the two most important countries ex-
cluded from the GATT. The following nonmarket economies have obtained full GATI
membership: Romania (since 1971), Hungary (since 1973), Poland (since 1967), and Yu-
goslavia (since 1966). See id.
27 Aronson, The New SovietJoint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for the Ameri-
(VOL. 15
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poses Soviet GATT membership because of the incompatibility of
the Soviet economic and political system with the free market princi-
ples of GATT.28 The Soviets, however, continue to regard GAIT
accession to be in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the
GAT'T members. 29
The Soviets have taken steps to become more integrated in the
world economy, demonstrated by their interest in joining the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and its sister organization the Inter-
national Bank for Restructuring and Development (IBRD) or the
World Bank.30 The inconvertible ruble makes such membership al-
most impossible, 3' but the Soviets announced recently that the ruble
is intended to become at least partially convertible by the early
1990s. 3 2
A. Cooperatives
Cooperatives are based on agreements between Soviet and for-
eign partners to develop or produce products jointly for sale on do-
can Investor, 19 LAw & POL'Y Ir'L Bus. 851,890-91 (1987). The U.S.S.R. earned consider-
able profits from the oil price hikes in 1974 and 1979 and allegedly encouraged the Arab
States to use oil as a weapon against the West. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National
Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States (Economic Reforms in the
USSR), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1987) (statement of D. Wigg, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense Policy Analysis) [hereinafter Hearings].
28 In 1987, the U.S. Government outlined its position regarding Soviet participation
in international organizations before a Senate subcommittee:
Today, the Soviet Union's ability to participate effectively or construc-
tively in international economic decision-making remains doubtful .... [A]
huge, "closed," non-market economy with few connections to the West
would be difficult [for the West] to absorb on economic grounds alone. In
addition, there is the fear that the Soviet Union's desire for a place at the
table stems more from a bent for political troublemaking than from any de-
sire to participate responsibly.
Hearings, supra note 27, at 25.
But see Note, Soviet Participation, supra note 25, at 499-510 (discussing advantages for
both the U.S.S.R. and the West from Soviet GATT membership).
29 The Soviet Union is expected to reapply for GATT observer status in 1990. van
Brabant, Planned Economies in the GATT Framework: The Soviet Case, 4 SOVIET ECON. 3, 5
(1988).
30 SherrJoint Ventures in the USSR: Soviet and Western Interests with Considerations for Nego-
tiations, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1988, at 25, 27. The Soviet Union attended the
Bretton Wood conference and in 1946 signed the Articles of Agreement that led to the
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Sokil, Soviet
Participation in the GATT, IMF, and World Bank, I GLOBAL ECON. POL'Y 79, 80 (1989). How-
ever, the U.S.S.R. failed to ratify the Agreement and was not invited to attend the 1947
Geneva Conference leading to the formation of GATT. Id. Instead, the U.S.S.R. estab-
lished the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) in 1949 both
to achieve a status in the world economy GATT could not provide it and to keep state
information from being divulged. Id. at 80-81. For a thorough discussion of East-bloc
participation in the IMF and World Bank, see generally V. AsSETro, THE SOVIET BLOC IN
THE IMF AND THE IBRD (1988).
31 Sokil, supra note 30, at 87-88. Although the currencies in Romania, Hungary, Po-
land, and China also are inconvertible, these countries remain members of the IMF and
the World Bank. Id. at 81.
32 See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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mestic or foreign markets.33 Though a cooperative resembles ajoint
venture, the cooperative partners do not combine to form a legal
entity.3 4 If the Soviet enterprise is authorized to engage directly in
foreign trade transactions, and if the cooperative will not require a
license transfer, the agreement can be negotiated directly between
the parties.3 5 Otherwise, the cooperative is arranged through FTOs,
or state committees, such as the State Committee on Science and
Technology or State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.3 6
The Law on the State Enterprises encourages Soviet enterprises to
enter cooperatives and joint ventures in order to develop economic
relations with foreign companies.3 7 Cooperative arrangements focus
primarily on needed machinery and technology for Soviet enter-
prises.38 Instead of importing machinery or technology, Soviet en-
terprises engage in cooperatives with foreign enterprises in
possession of the appropriate machinery or technology. This ar-
rangement is less expensive than importing machinery and, more im-
portantly, does not require the use of foreign currency. Also,
cooperatives are usually preferable to licensing technology, and pro-
vide Soviet enterprises with valuable insight into Western produc-
33 For discussions of the different cooperative agreements, see Pedersen, Joint Ven-
tures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 391-93
(1975), and Hoya & Stein, Drafting Contracts in U.S.-Soviet Trade, 7 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1057 (1975). On June 1, 1988, the Supreme Soviet adopted a new, more restrictive "Law
on Cooperatives." 28 I.L.M. 719 (1989). See also Rabinovich, The Procedure for Signing
Transactions with Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations, 22 Ir'L LAw. 143 (1988).
34 Joint ventures are contractual arrangements between two or more enterprises cre-
ating an identifiable entity to undertake joint production, marketing, or other activities.
The parties contract to pool their resources and agree to manage the operation jointly and
share the risks associated with the venture. Berman,Joint Ventures Between United States Firms
and Soviet Economic Organizations, 1 INT'L TRADE LJ. 139, 144 (1975-76). The cooperative,
on the other hand, represents "a sale of capital equipment and technology, but it is also
marked by a relatively high degree of interdependence between the parties involved, con-
tinuing transfers over 'a period of several years, and the creation of organizational ties,
although the partners maintain their separate identities." Pedersen, supra note 33, at 391.
The cooperative may also be viewed as ajoint venture with no joint equity. See Scriven, Co-
operation in East-West Trade: the Equity Joint Venture, 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. 105 (1982).35 For a discussion of Soviet licensing law, see Armstrong, Transferring U.S. Technology
to the Soviets: Some Practical Legal Problems, 16 INT'L LAw. 737 (1982). Most industrialized
nations restrict Eastern Bloc transfers of technology with potential military uses through
membership in the Coordinating Committee Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). See
Aronson, supra note 27, at 887-91.
36 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
37 The Law on the State Enterprises provides that:
Enterprises implement their economic ties, with firms in the capitalist
and developing countries,' on the basis of the principles of mutual advantage
and equal rights. The main methods of developing these ties are cooperative
production, scientific technical arrangements on a longterm and balanced ba-
sis, and the creation of joint enterprises and production facilities.
Law on State Enterprise, adopted June 30, 1987,'by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet,
1987 Ved. Verkh. Soy: SSSR No. 26, item 385, para. 19(3).
38 For a discussion of whether the joint venture will replace the cooperative, see
Miller & Surowell, Co-production in the USSR: Joint Production Without Joint Ventures, 23
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1988, at 61.
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tion and marketing methods. 39 .
B. Joint Ventures
The law permitting joint ventures (Sovmestie predprijatja) be-
tween Soviet enterprises and foreign partners was adopted on Janu-
ary 13, 1987, under Decrees issued by the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and the Council of Ministers. 40 On September 17, 1987, 4 t
March 17, 1988,42 December 2, 1988,43 and March 7, 1989,44 the
Council of Ministers passed Decrees amending the joint venture leg-
islation. In addition to this legislation, Soviet ministries have issued
a number of administrative regulations concerning Soviet joint ven-
ture law.4 5
39. For a discussion of the motives for engaging in cooperatives and joint ventures
with Western enterprises, see Pedersen, supra note 33, at 393-97.
40 The Supreme Soviet authorized the establishment. of Soviet joint ventures with
foreign participation on Jan. 13, 1987. Decree of the Presidium "On Questions Concern-
ing the Establishment in the Territory of the U.S.S.R. and Operation of Joint Ventures,
International Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and For-
eign Organisations, Firms and Management Bodies," 1987 Ved: Verkh. Sov. SSR No.
6352-XI, translated and reprinted in D. KELLEY &J. SAUL, THE SOVIET JoINT ENTERPRISE DE-
CREE: LAW AND STRUCTURE 35 (1989). The Council of Ministers that same day issued the
Decree "On the Procedure for the Creation on the Teritory of the USSR and the Activi-
ties ofJoint Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms of Capi-
talist and Developing Countries." 1987 SP SSSR No. 9, item 40, translated and reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 749, 749-58 (1987) [hereinafter Joint Venture Decree 49]; also translated and re-
printed in D. KELLEY & J. SAUL, supra, at 36-45.
By comparison, the Chinese government adopted joint venture legislation in 1979
that allowed foreign investors to own shares in Chinese joint ventures. For discussions of
the Chinese experience with joint ventures, see Gelatt, Legal and Extra-legal Issues in Joint
Venture Negotiations, 1 J. CHINESE L. 217 (1987); Bloomfield, Legal Aspects ofJoint Ventures in
China, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 327 (1986); Rich,Joint Ventures in China: The Legal Challenge, 15
INT'L LAW. 183, 209 (1981) (joint venture law "sloppy and inconsistent" and "on its face,
replete with ambiguities and open to questions"); Note, The Joint Venture Law of the People's
Republic of China: Business and Legal Perspectives, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 73, 110 (1981-83) ("con-
sistently imprecise," and "significantly ambiguous"); Comment, The United States-People's
Republic of China Income Tax Treaty: Opening the Door to Increased Economic Cooperation, 13 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 527, 527 n.3 (1988) (Chinese joint venture law generally successful).
For a recent comparison of the Soviet and Chinese joint venture legislation, see Mirabito,
Prospects for Western Investment: A Comparison ofJoint Venture Law in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
and China, 12 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 103, 110-17, 127-35 (1989).
41 Decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of Sep. 17, 1987, "On Additional
Measures to Streamline Foreign Economic. Activity in the New Conditions of Economic
Management," 1987 SP SSSR No. 1074 [hereinafter Decree 1074].
42 Decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of Mar. 17, 1988, 1988 SP SSSR No.
352.
43 Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of Dec. 2, 1988, "On Further De-
veloping the Foreign Economic Activity of State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enter-
prises, Associations, and Organizations," 1988 SP SSSR No. 1405, reprinted in D. KELLEY &
J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 114-21, from the English version of Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Dec.
29, 1988, at 17-18 [hereinafter Decree 1405].
44 Decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of Mar. 7, 1989, "On Measures of
State Regulation of Foreign Economic Activity," 1989 SP SSSR No. 203.
45 E.g., Regulation of the U.S.S.R. State Bank and the U.S.S.R. Bank for Foreign Eco-
nomic Affairs of.Sep. 22, 1987, "Procedure for Crediting And Settlement of Accounts of
joint Ventures, International Amalgamations and Organizations of the U.S.S.R. and other
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 15
1. Organizing the Joint Venture
The process of organizing the joint venture is crucial and may
determine the profitability of the venture to the foreign investor.46
The process includes the negotiation and signing of the foundation
documents, usually a letter of intent. 47 The foreign partner should
address a number of problems unique to the Soviet legal economic
system before signing the foundation documents. 48 The foreign
partner that fails to address these problems in a timely fashion may
find Soviet authorities and the Soviet joint venture partner unwilling
to amend the foundation documents to favor the foreign joint ven-
ture partner.
The letter of intent does not obligate the negotiating parties to
form a joint venture, 49 but serves to outline the foundation docu-
ments under which the joint venture is conducted. 50 Another main
purpose of the letter of intent is to ensure protection for the foreign
joint venture partner during the negotiation process.5 1 In negotiat-
CMEA Countries, as well as ofJoint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organisa-
tions and of Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries," No. 149, reprinted in D.
KELLEY AND J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 72-91; Regulations of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Fi-
nance of Nov. 24, 1987, "Concerning the Procedure for Registering Joint Ventures, Inter-
national Amalgamations and Organizations Established in the Territory of the U.S.S.R.
with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Finns and Authorities," No.
224, 92-97; Instructional Circular No. 53-13-09 of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance and the
U.S.S.R. Central Board of Statistics of Feb. 27, 1987, "On Accounting and Bookkeeping
Procedures at Joint Ventures, International Amalgamation and Organizations Established
in the U.S.S.R. Territory," reprinted in D. KELLEY ANDJ. SAUL, supra note 40, at 56-57; Regu-
lation of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance of May 4, 1987, "On the Taxation of Joint Ven-
tures," No. 124, reprinted in D. KELLEY AND J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 58-63, as partially
amended by Regulation of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance of Nov. 30, 1987, "On Partial
Changes in the Taxation of Joint Ventures," No. 226, reprinted in D. KELLEY AND J. SAUL,
supra note 40, at 64-66 [hereinafter Joint Venture Tax Reg.].
The text of these and other regulations may be obtained in English translation
through the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "Vneshekonomservice," 5/2
Kuibyshev Street, Moscow 103735, U.S.S.R.
46 "It will be stressed, first of all, that the establishment of a JEO [joint economic
organization] is a fairly crucial process which shapes the decisive prerequisites for its effec-
tive operation and lays the foundations for its activity." USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE
LEGAL STATUS OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE USSR 61 (1989).
47 Before preliminary discussions ever begin, one joint venture partner has taken the
initiative to form the enterprise and locate partners. Although the initiative may be either
Soviet or foreign, id., the foreign partner will usually in practice take the initiative. The
foreign partner contacts the Soviet partner either directly or through ministerial channels.
48 Osakwe, supra note 2, at 9. For a discussion of the various aspects of Soviet law
that negotiators should consider, see generally W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAw (1988).
49 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 73-74.
50 Id. at 70-73.
51 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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ing the foundation documents, 52 the foreign company may be re-
quired to furnish a potential Soviet joint venture partner with
technical information and documents regarding the foreign com-
pany's technological contribution to the venture. 53 Unless it is ad-
dressed in the letter of intent, this exchange of information between
two unrelated companies presents inherent difficulties. The ex-
change may itself constitute an activity that requires export licens-
ing.54 Moreover, the foreign company has to ensure that its property
is adequately protected, especially in the case where the parties do
not agree to form a joint venture. 55
Under the original Joint Venture Decree, the foundation docu-
ments were reviewed, then submitted to the Council of Ministers for
approval by regional and central ministries and agencies. 56 The doc-
uments then had the force of law as to matters involving the joint
venture and could supersede contrary law, even the Joint Venture
Decree. 57 To ease the approval process for smaller joint ventures,58
the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers amended the
procedure in 1987.59 The amendment provided that joint ventures
52 One commentator has noted the following characteristics of Soviet negotiating be-
havior:
1) suspicion of U.S. and an expectation of hostility;
2) reluctance to compromise;
3) perception that concessions by other side indicate weakness following which Sovi-
ets should stick to original proposal or take harder line;
4) use of "red herring" technique; i.e. making startling proposals to stir up anxiety,
later withdrawing some of them in order to demand a concession in return;
5) extensive use of publicity as a means of negotiation;
6) stubborn commitment to oft-repeated positions, replaced only by new, stubbornly
pursued commitments;
7) willingness to abandon a position or commitment suddenly without particular con-
cern for continuity or credibility;
8) reluctance to use informal meetings as negotiating tools;
9) pursuit of "agreements in principle;"
10) frequent use of propaganda in negotiations, sometimes as a primary objective of
the negotiations, sometimes as a means of achieving agreement;
11) tendency to react to changes in international tension. C. JONSSON, SOVIET BAR-
GAINING BEHAVIOR: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN CASE 41-54 (1979).
For a more recent discussion of Soviet negotiating styles, see R. SMITH, NEGOTIATING
wrrH THE SOVIETS 48-62 (1989).
53 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 2. In practice, preliminary feasibility
reports are always required. Detailed, objective, and timely coordinated reports are
thought to aid the parties in their formulation of the foundation documents. U.S.S.R.
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 59-60.
54 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55 The joint venture legislation provides strict confidentiality requirements which ap-
ply once the joint venture is organized. However, the Soviets have recognized that foreign
companies often have disclosure obligations in other jurisdictions and have negotiated
appropriate exceptions to the confidentiality requirements. See Dean, Updating SovietJoint
Venture Law and Practice, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1988, at 53, 57.
56 Decree 1074, supra note 41.
57 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 2.
58 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 74.
59 Once the foundation document is approved and the joint venture is registered, the
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can be approved by lower levels of the ministries and departments
and the regional councils of ministers.60
The foundation documents may contain any provisions that are
not contrary to Soviet law.6 1 The Joint Venture Decree specifies a
number of matters pertaining to the foundation and operation of the
joint venture that shall be determined in the foundation documents.
The following must be specified: the subject and objectives of the
joint venture's activity, 62 its location, 63 the partners,64 the size of au-
thorized capital powers of its managerial bodies, 65 the procedure for
decision-making by the management, primarily its Board, 66 the pro-
cedure for transferring rights to industrial property by the partners
to a joint venture, 67 the protection of the rights to industrial prop-
erty abroad, 68 the procedure for commercial use of the rights to in-
dustrial property,69 the branch and representation openings, 70 the
procedure for deciding the amount of annual deductions from prof-
its into the reserve fund, 71 the listing of the joint venture's assets,
their formation, and expenditure, 72 depreciation charges, 73 the fur-
nishing of partners with information to aid in their exercise of con-
trol,74  the content of collective contracts, 75  and liquidation
procedures. 76 The Decree's enumeration is not exhaustive. The
foundation documents must provide for other matters related to the
foundation and operation of the joint venture.77 Typically, a variety
joint venture acquires the rights of a legal person. Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40,
pars. 9. Until registration* the joint venture is forbidden to make any deals or sign any
contracts. USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 71. In addition, joint ventures
may open settlement or current accounts with Soviet banks only after registration. Id.
Once organized, the joint venture obtains legal status, and its property is fully protected
under Soviet law. For a thorough discussion of ihe protection of property under Soviet
law, see 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 59-100.
60 It is unclear whether approval at a lower level provides the joint venture partner
with the same legal rights provided by the approval of the Council of Ministers. Sherr,
supra note 30, at 34.
61 For a comparison of the contract law in the Soviet Union and the United States, see
E. FARNSWORTH & V. MOZOLIN, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
62 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 7.
63 Id.
641d.
65 Id.
6 6 Id., paras. 7 & 21.
67 Id., para. 17.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id., para. 19.
71 Id., para. 30.
72 Id.
73 Id., para. 30.
74 Id., para. 44.
75 Id., para. 47.
76 Id., paras. 7 & 51. For further relevant discussion, see USSR ACADEMY OF SCI-
ENCES, supra note 46, at 72-73.
77 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 73.
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of other important issues are covered by separate, agreements that
are incorporated by reference to the documents.78 Because the joint
venture operates on the basis of the foundation documents, it is very
important that questions left unanswered by Soviet legislation are
resolved in these foundation documents. 79
3. Operating the Joint Venture
Among the issues to be addressed in operating the joint venture
are the roles of the foreign partner in management, equity owner-
ship, production and marketing control, labor relations, the relation
to the state, dispute resolution, and dissolution. In addition, several
financial considerations, including currency problems, 0 should be
addressed.
a. Ownership
Until the Soviet Union adopted the joint venture legislation on
January 13, 1987, foreigners were prohibited from owning equity in
Soviet joint ventures. 81 The original Joint Venture Decree required
more than fifty percent Soviet ownership of the joint venture. 82 The
amendments passed on December 2, 1988, repealed the requirement
of Soviet dominance. 83 The new Decree allows foreign-participants
to own up to ninety-nine percent of the shares in the joint venture. 84
78 See id. at 72.
79 Id. at 73.
80 The partners are free to decide how to finance the venture. The Bank for Foreign
Economic Relations and the State Bank both provide debt financing, and the joint venture
may seek financing from foreign financial institutions and companies. For a discussion of
the restructuring of the Soviet banking system, see Maggs, Joint Enterprises in Relation to
Soviet Banking and Finance Law, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1988, at 13. The Sovi-
ets have taken steps to make financing available in both rubles andforeign hard currency.
In Jan. 1988, the Soviet Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (Vneshekonombank) allowed a
Soviet joint venture to issue a 100 million Swiss Franc ten-year bond. See Vlachoutsicos,
Doing Business with the Soviets: What, Who and How?, 23 COLUM. J.,WORLD Bus., Summer
1988, at 67, 71.
81 The Soviets were reluctant to allow foreign-owned equity in Soviet economic orga-
nizations, both by Western and East European investors. Pedersen, supra note 33, at 390.
However, the Jan. 1987 decree of the Council of Ministers covering Eastern European
partners, 1987 SP SSSR No. 48, provides no limits to foreign investors' rights of owner-
ship, thus enabling Eastern European partners to control joint ventures completely.
Other foreign investors may not own 100% of a joint venture, even after Decree 1405. See
Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31.
82 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 5.
83 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31. However, most of the Eastern European
countries had already allowed foreign dominance. Czechoslovakia now permits foreigners
to wholly own companies on its soil. Czechoslovakia Eases Joint Venture Law as it Embarks on
Major Economic Reform, Daily Executive Report, Apr. 23, 1990, at A-6, col. 2 [hereinafter
Czech Reform]. The joint venture legislation of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia allow up
to 99% foreign participation. In Poland the foreign participant may own from 25% to
100% of the enterprise but must invest a minimum of 25 million Zlotys. Romania is now
the only country that limits foreign participation to 49%. See Albeseder,Joint Venture Devel-
opments in Eastern Europe, 29 EUR. TAX'N 270, 272-73 (1989).
84 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31.
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The joint venture is not required to have a minimum capital,85
and the participants are free to contribute cash or noncash assets.8 6
Contributions made by the Soviet partner are likely to be buildings,
machinery, real estate, and rubles, while contributions of the foreign
partner are likely to be licenses, technology, machinery, and foreign
currency.8 7
b. Management
Acquisition of Western management methods is one of the pri-
mary objectives in permitting foreigners to own equity in Soviet joint
ventures; therefore, the law allows the partners to decide issues re-
garding management.88 The original Joint Venture Decree required
the Chairman of the Board and the Director General to be Soviet
citizens.89 This requirement was repealed, and under the new joint
venture legislation, the Soviets have responded by allowing foreign
citizens to be both Chairman and Director General.90
Representation on the Board is not required to be determined
by ownership, but members of the board are "persons appointed by
the participants." 9' Western investors are not likely to accept an ar-
rangement in which they do not have at least an equal voice in man-
agement. Therefore, negotiators should contract for at least equal
representation on the Board of Directors, or alternatively, that major
decisions by the Board be made by unanimous decision. The new
Joint Venture Decree provides that the principle of unanimous deci-
sions is extended to all "fundamental issues." 92 Because the Decree
does not provide guidelines, the term should be defined in the
agreement. 93
85 "The Soviet state and the participants in a joint enterprise shall not be liable for its
obligations, and the joint enterprise shall not be liable for the obligations of the Soviet
State and of its participants." Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 18. Because
the joint venture's liability is limited to its capital contribution, the lack of a minimum
capital investment is somewhat surprising. Paragraph 18 further provides that affiliates
established by the joint venture are not liable for the joint venture nor is the joint venture
liable for its affiliates. Id.
86 The law requires the joint venture to transfer profits to reserve funds until this
amount reaches 25% of the registered capital. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
87 The Soviet and foreign venture partners value their respective contributions in
rubles by agreement "with due regard for world market prices" and at the official ex-
change rate established by Gosbank on an agreed date. See infra notes 132-43 and accom-
panying text.
88 See Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 21.
89 Id.
90 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31. While the management under the Romanian
joint venture legislation must consist of Romanian citizens, the Bulgarian, Hungarian and
Yugoslavian all allow foreign management. Albeseder, supra note 83, at 274-75. The
Czechoslovakian legislation ofJan. 1, 1989, does not state whether the management must
consist of Czechoslovakian citizens. Bakes, supra note 8, at 88.
91 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 21.
92 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31.
93 Major decisions may include the types and quantities of goods to be produced,
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Even though the Board of Directors, partners, and government
officials have vested interests in the joint venture, the on-site man-
agement must be free to make decisions without excessive interfer-
ence. Soviet enterprises traditionally have been operated by one-
person management in which only one director is responsible. 94 Be-
cause one-person management does not allow shared management,
the foreign joint venture partner should contract for a departure
from Soviet tradition, especially when one considers the managerial
secrecy generally surrounding Soviet enterprises. Given the benefits
derived by the management participation of the Western partner, the
Soviets are likely to depart from these traditions. 95
c. Labor Relations
Labor relations in the Soviet Union are highly regulated and
raise some important issues in operating the joint venture. 96 Except
sources and types of raw materials and components, export and domestic marketing, and
labor relations policies. Aronson, supra note 27, at 873. In a recently signed joint venture
agreement, major decisions included provisions on additional funding from partners and
outside loans, business expansion plans, and allocation of awards, bonuses, and reserve
funds, all of which required a unanimous vote by the Board of Directors. Laurita & Mc-
Gloin, US-Soviet Joint Ventures: Current Status and Prospects, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Sum-
mer 1988, at 43, 48-49. Another list of "fundamental" considerations includes the
following: annual budgets; investment and construction plans; comprehensive production
and marketing plans; potential changes in the purposes of the joint venture; transactions
that may be made in excess of given amounts; purchases of various types of property; loans
in excess of given amounts and given repayment periods; amendments to foundation doc-
uments and contracts; changes in capital structure and amount of capitalization, including
reversion to ownership shares, transfers of shares, and mergers with other juridical per-
sons; establishment of other branches or representation offices; election of key personnel,
including the Chairman of the Board and Director General, and their continuation in of-
fice; approval of important documents such as profit and loss accounts, financial state-
ments, and tax returns; periodic or special distribution (or nondistribution) of specified
company funds; acquisition, use, and disposition of intellectual property rights; and termi-
nation and liquidation of the joint venture. E. THEROUX & A. GEORGE, JOINT VENTURES IN
THE SOVIET UNION: LAW AND PRACTICE 21-22 (1989).
94 Although assistant directors may conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise,
the managing director undertakes sole responsibility. Pedersen, supra note 33, at 431.
Because the managing director is alone responsible, the contract should provide for de-
parture from the strict Soviet liability rules traditionally imposed on the director.
95 Aronson, supra note 27, at 875.
96 One source lists seven different employer-employee relationships that exist under
Soviet law and employment contracts:
1) the employer is obligated to hire a specific employee who is obligated
to work for the specific employer; 2) the employer is obligated to hire a spe-
cific employee who is obligated by law to work, but not obligated to work for
the specific employer; 3) the employer is obligated to hire a specific em-
ployee who is under no obligation to work at all; 4) the employer is indirectly
compelled by its production plan to hire a certain number of employees to
meet production targets and hires an individual who is obligated by law to
work, but not for that employer; 5) the employer is indirectly compelled by
its production plan and hires an individual who is under no obligation to
work; 6) the employer is under no obligation to hire, but the individual is
under legal obligation to work; 7) the employer is under no obligation to
hire, and the individual is under no obligation to work.
0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 161.
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for wages, vacation, and pension, the Soviet legislation allows labor
relations to be stipulated in the joint venture agreement.9 7 Even
though negotiators should contract for labor relations that accom-
modate Western management methods, the foreign partner may be
pressured to agree to the Soviet labor system.98 Trade union com-
mittees should be included in the negotiations over the joint venture
agreement, as Soviet law requires the joint venture to conclude col-
lective bargaining agreements with trade unions.99 With the excep-
tion of military personnel and collective farmers, all Soviet citizens
are members of a trade union.100 At the factory level, the local trade
union committee administers all matters affecting the employees, en-
forces labor legislation and safety rules, and advocates employees in-
terests in wage and dismissal matters.' 0 ' The local unions should be
included in the negotiations involving labor conditions, thereby
avoiding potential disputes between management and employees.10 2
An employer's ability to exercise discretion over employees is
important in maintaining quality control, but this ability is limited by
Soviet labor law and the joint venture law, which provide various
protection measures for the Soviet employees.' 03 Products of mar-
ketable quality are of major concern to the foreign partner in the
Soviet joint venture.' 0 4 A state quality board (Gospriyemka) controls
product quality. However, because the Soviet standard is not diffi-
cult to meet, higher product quality is required to compete in foreign
markets.' 0 5 The ability to trade in foreign markets is of special con-
cern to the foreign partner since repatriation of profits depends on
the income paid in foreign hard currency.' 0 6
Control over compensation of employees may enable the for-
eign partner to control product quality.' 0 7 Many people mistakenly
97 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 48. See Carpenter & Smith, U.S.-
Soviet Joint Ventures: A New-Beginning in the Fall, 43 Bus. LAw. 79, 82, 87-88 (1987).
98 Aronson, supra note 27, at 875.
99 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 47.
100 Aronson, supra note 27, at 875.
101 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 159.
102 Aronson, supra note 27, at 877.
103 See 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 157-78.
104 For a discussion of the product quality in selected industries, see generally M. HILL
& R. McKAY, SOVIET PRODUCT QUALITY (1988).
105 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 292-93. Soviet enterprises employ "enter-
prise standards" to reduce costs and guarantee the quality of supply sources; the industrial
ministries likewise publish "industrial standards." By law, both sets must comply with the
nation's "state standards" of adequate quality. See M. HILL & R. McKAY, supra note 103, at
8-15. On Aug. 31, 1988, the U.S.S.R. State Committee issued regulations imposing ceil-
ings on prices set by private enterprises. The regulations require private persons to set
prices that are no greater than 10% above the state standard price. Decree on Certain
Questions Concerning the System of Pricing in Connection with the Coming into Force of
the U.S.S.R. Law "On Cooperztives in the U.S.S.R.," 12 BULL. NORM. AKT. MIN. & VED.
SSR 3-4 (1988). See Osakwe, supra note 2, at 13 n.17.
106 See infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
107 For a discussion proposing the Soviets implement the Japanese labor system, see
[VOL. 15
1990] WESTERN BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY IN THE SOVIET UNION 185
believe that the Soviet Union is a country with vast resources of inex-
pensive labor. In reality, the Soviet Union is a country with labor
shortage, due primarily to its ideological commitment to provide full
employment. 108
The Soviet government originally enforced a wage system which
allowed very little differentiation between employees. 109 Wages paid
to Soviet employees of the joint venture are regulated by the stan-
dards of Soviet law, which now provides for an incentive wage sys-
tem.' 10 Rather than wages being determined on state level, wages
will be determined on the factory level. "'I This enables foreign part-
ners to negotiate for a wage incentive system in the joint venture
agreement. 12
Soviet law guarantees citizens employment at the State mini-
mum wage or above. 1 3 This constitutional guarantee entitles the
Soviet employee to a degree of security to which some foreign em-
ployers are not accustomed. The joint venture partner can deter-
mine wages and bonuses, subject to the minimum wage
guarantee.' 14 While management now has the right to dismiss em-
ployees for reasons specified in Soviet legislation, the law originally
required prior consent of the local trade union committee.' 15 The
legislation adopted on December 2, 19.88, provides that issues of dis-
missal are decided between the partners. 116
Despite these changes, and the changes that are occurring in the
regulations, it remains difficult to dismiss employees. 1 7 Foreign
partners are not likely to be given discretion to hire and fire, but
negotiators may contract for objective performance and productivity
Khrutskiy,Japan as a Model for Soviet Reform, 1 GLOBAL ECON. POL'Y 31, 47 (1989) ("Restruc-
turing in the Soviet Union would be better served by looking to Japan rather than the
United States.").
108 Laurita & McGloin, supra note 93, at 49.
109 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 159-60.
110 Decree 1405 provides in part: "[M]atters concerning the employment and dismis-
sal of staff, the amounts and conditions of pay and the amounts of remuneration of em-
ployees in Soviet rubles shall be decided by the joint venture." Decree 1405, supra note
43, para. 31.
III Id.
112 Aronson, supra note 27, at 877.
113 Id.
114 Soviet law states that "provisions of work agreements deteriorating the situation of
all workers and employees in relation to the law on labor of the U.S.S.R. and Union Re-
publics are invalid." KZoT RSFSR (Labor Code), art. 5 (1964). This law applies to all
agreements that establish labor conditions. USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at
136. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. considers this labor legislation to apply to Soviet citizens
working abroad. Id. at 135-36.
115 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 174-75.
116 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31.
117 The employee is free to terminate the labor contract by giving two months notice.
0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 169. Employees fall into three groups with respect
to discharge: 1) ordinary employees with no special protection against discharge; 2) ordi-
nary employees with special protection against discharge; and 3) employees with special
responsibilities who may be discharged on both special and ordinary grounds. Id. at 170.
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standards. Thejoint venture agreement may provide for committees
to review complaints against employees and to bring cases before
the local trade union committee.' 18 Although foreign partners may
have no choice but to agree to the Soviet constitutional employee
guarantees, in order to enhance productivity the Soviets should be
willing to accept some sort of disciplinary action against poor
performance. "19
Although the law provides that "the personnel ofjoint ventures
shall be made up principally of Soviet citizens,"' 20 it does not limit
the number of foreigners permitted to be employed by the joint ven-
ture. Interpretations of the law indicate that the Soviets are reluctant
to accept an unlimited number of foreign employees.' 2 ' Therefore,
it is important that the agreement provides for the employment of as
many foreign employees as are required by the foreign partner.
d. State Relations
By law, the joint venture is independent from central planning
and its assets are separate from the state budget. 22 Although for-
eign companies might find this independence advantageous, it could
prove to be a disadvantage. The Soviet Central Plan determines the
allocation of supplies and raw materials throughout the domestic
economy.' 23 Without integrating the joint venture into the central
plan, the joint venture could face a shortage of needed materials. 12 4
This would necessitate suspending production or spending foreign
currency to import needed supplies. This independence from cen-
tral planning could therefore "undermine the benefits of having ac-
cess to Soviet production materials."' 2 5 To avoid a shortage of
supplies, the joint venture should be coordinated with the Central
Plan. 126 The management should project the needed raw materials
and other supplies as well as a delivery timetable and submit these to
central planning authorities. 127 The agreement should guarantee
118 Aronson, supra note 27, at 876.
119 The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has recognized the increasing role ofjoint ven-
tures in setting terms and conditions of employment such as "questions of hire and dismis-
sal of workers [and] the forms and size of payment .... USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
supra note 46, at 146.
120 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 47.
121 Aronson, supra note 27, at 877.
122 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, paras. 6 & 15.
123 O. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 105-14.
124 Facilitating production, however, are recent regulations that enable joint ventures
to qualify for one-year, renewable "general permits" for "the import and export of goods
required" to operate the ventures. Regulations of Mar. 27, 1987, "For the Issuance of
Permits for Shipping Goods and Property into and out of the U.S.S.R., and for Re-export
of Goods," para. 2.4, reprinted in D. KELLEY &J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 104.
125 Aronson, supra note 27, at 877.
126 See Dore, Plan and Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the USSR, 8 SYR.J. INT'L
L. & COM. 29, 87-89 (1980).
127 Aronson, supra note 27, at 877.
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that the schedule is incorporated into the Central Plan. Provisions
should also be made for access to supply reserves in the event of an
unforeseen need. Negotiators should attempt to contract for free-
dom from unlimited government inspections and freedom to seek
sources of supply outside the Soviet Union if Soviet domestic prod-
ucts fail to meet stipulated quality standards, to avoid some of the
negative effects of being incorporated in the Central Plan. 128
Apart from central planning, the law creates a different relation
between the joint venture and the Soviet government. The FTOs are
required to act as intermediaries for sales and purchases of domestic
products. 129 Given the importance of the FTOs, the joint venture
agreement should allow the joint venture partners to choose specific
FTOs with experience in domestic sales. The reliance on FTOs for
domestic marketing has both advantages and disadvantages for the
foreign partner. 130 The FFO may prove useful to foreigners unfa-
miliar with the Soviet market and uncertain as to the demand for
various goods, but foreign negotiators should contract for an alter-
native relationship with the domestic market. Because of the conflict
between the Soviet interest in exports and foreigners' interest in do-
mestic sales, the FTOs may receive directions from the Ministry of
Foreign Trade to focus on exports rather than domestic sales, or may
seek to prevent the joint venture from competing with Soviet enter-
prises. 131 In addition, the use of FTOs will raise costs since the FTO
must be paid a commission. The potential foreign investor should,
therefore, negotiate for the right to sell joint venture products di-
rectly to those domestic enterprises which enjoy foreign trade rights.
Likewise, the joint venture should be able to obtain supplies directly
from the appropriate ministry rather than through FTOs.
e. Foreign Currency
Foreign currency is required both for operating the joint ven-
ture and for repatriating profits in convertible currency.' 32 Estab-
128 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 110-16.
129 Although the joint venture may transact necessary export and import operations
independently under Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 24, the joint venture's
domestic purchases and sales must "be effectuated ... through the respective Soviet for-
eign trade organizations." Id., para. 26.
130 For a discussion of the working relationship with the FTO, see Vlachoutsicos,
Where the Ruble Stops in Soviet Trade, 64 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 82.
131 See Aronson, supra note 27, at 855-61.
132 For example, under the Polish joint venture legislation of Feb. 15, 1989, the joint
venture must resell 15% of its export income, in foreign currency, to the Polish Foreign
Exchange Bank. The President of the Foreign Investment Agency may lower this rate
where economically justifiable at the establishment of the joint venture. After the standard
resale of foreign currency, the joint venture may use or distribute any remaining currency.
The profits for foreign shareholders are freely transferable. Czubinski, Poland: New Foreign
Currency Law andJoint Venture Activity, 29 EUR. TAx'N 235, 236-37 (1989). On Apr. 20, 1990,
the Czechoslovak Parliament adopted a similar measure, requiring joint ventures operat-
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lishing the joint venture's operation and paying for imports and
wages to non-Soviet employees requires foreign currency.
The foreign 'currency problem should be limited by maximizing
ruble expenses and minimizing foreign currency expenses.13 3 Also,
the foreign currency needed to repatriate profits could be eliminated
if the joint venture made noncash distribution to the foreign part-
ner.1 3 4 However, in most cases the problem cannot be eliminated.
Without the guarantee of sufficient foreign currency to repatriate
dividends or capital distributions, foreign companies are not likely to
assume the joint venture risk. Although the law guarantees repatria-
tion of profits,' 35 it does not guarantee sufficient foreign currency,
thereby leaving the joint venture on its own.' 36 One solution is for
the joint venture partners to agree to the foreign partner retaining
the foreign currency profits in exchange for the Soviet partner re-
taining an equivalent share of ruble profits.' 3 7 Assuming that each
of the partners owns a fifty percent share with the joint venture real-
izing profits of one hundred dollars and one hundred rubles, each
partner realizes profits of fifty dollars and fifty rubles. Instead the
partners could agree that the foreign partner retain the one hundred
dollars, in return for which the Soviet partner would retain its fifty
rubles plus the rubles equivalent of fifty dollars. Another approach
is for Soviet enterprises with accumulated foreign currency to
purchase the products of the joint venture for foreign currency. ' 38
Furthermore, the law is silent regarding the convertibility of ru-
bles into foreign currency, which is significant to the joint venture
that produces goods for the domestic market. One commentator has
suggested that the joint venture agreement could permit the joint
venture to borrow foreign exchange from foreign partners or foreign
financial institutions.' 3 9 The repayment of these loans in convertible
currency should then be guaranteed by the Bank for Foreign Trade,
rather than by the joint venture partner. Whatever means negotia-
tors choose, it is important that the foreign investor is guaranteed
sufficient foreign currency to repatriate profits in the event that ex-
ing abroad to convert at least 30% of their hard currency profits into the Czech crown.
Czech Reform, supra note 83, at A-7, col. 1.
133 Sherr, supra note 30, at 28-29.
134 See Note, The 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law: New Possibilities for Cooperation and Growth
in East-West Relations, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 581, 589-91 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
1987Joint Venture Law] for a discussion of import substitution, allowing the joint venture to
use greater amounts of foreign currency, and countertrade.
135 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 32.
136 Joint ventures require foreign currency for several reasons. For one, only profits
from foreign sales may be transferred out of the U.S.S.R. See id., para. 32. In addition,
enterprises require foreign currency to import products and technology and to pay non-
Soviet employees.
137 Sherr, supra note 30, at 28.
138 Id.
139 Aronson, supra note 27, at 863.
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ports fail to generate the income required for those purposes. Ar-
guably, without such assurance, "the investment in the joint venture
would be unjustifiably risky to the foreign partner and dispropor-
tionately beneficial to the Soviets."' 140 Even though the law guaran-
tees foreign partners that distributions of profits from the joint
venture will be converted into foreign currency,' 41 the law also pro-
vides that the joint venture will receive no state subsidies.' 42 The
joint venture is expected to generate the required foreign exchange
entirely through export activities.
The law does, however, permit the joint venture to take advan-
tage of the foreign currency credits from the State Bank and the
Bank of Foreign Trade.143 The credit provision is important to the
joint venture, especially before it has been able to accumulate for-
eign currency, but is available only "if needed." If the foreign part-
ner expects to rely on the foreign currency credit, it is important that
the term is defined as broadly as possible.
f Valuation
Currency problems in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union in
particular, 144 cause considerable concern among foreign inves-
tors.145 Recent Soviet interest in joining the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank demonstrates their intent of becoming in-
tegrated into the world economy. 146 Because membership is not
possible with an inconvertible currency such as the ruble, the Soviets
announced their intent to make the ruble at least partially converti-
ble by the early 1990s. The December 2, 1988, legislation in-
troduces both a new currency rate as of January 1, 1991, and
auctions of foreign currency by Vnesheconombank.' 47 The legislation
also commissioned a feasibility study on the convertibility of the
ruble.' 4 8
The problems concerning both the inconvertibility of the Soviet
140 Id.
141 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 32.
142 Id., para. 23.
143 Id., para. 27. However, the State Bank and the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs
may ensure that credits are put to specific uses, are secured, and are paid for timely. Id.,
para. 28.
144 The Soviets have several incentives for setting a fair value to the ruble: 1) Fair rates
will encourage foreign interest in joint ventures; 2) The more joint ventures prosper in the
Soviet Union, the more the ruble spreads around the world; this alone may enhance the
integrity of the ruble in the free market; and 3) An overvalued ruble harms chances for
future respect in the international market. Note, 1987Joint Venture Law, supra note 134, at
589 n.52.
145 Kelley, The Soviet Joint Enterprse Decree: An Executive Summary and Overview, in D. KEL-
LEY & J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 2.
146 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
147 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 16.
148 Id.
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domestic currency and valuation should be addressed in the joint
venture agreement. As the value of the ruble is not determined ob-
jectively on the international exchange market according to supply
and demand, the exchange rate does not reflect the relative value of
foreign currency. Valuation is particularly a problem in the forma-
tion, when the partners make their capital contributions.
Several models attempt to resolve the valuation problem in
Western joint ventures with socialist economies.' 49 The Soviet joint
venture law incorporates the "calculation system," which provides
valuation in both a specific foreign currency and the socialist cur-
rency on the basis of an agreed upon exchange rate.15 0 The adopted
calculation system is modified to value contributions in rubles ac-
cording to the agreement reached "with due regard for world market
prices," given the official exchange rate established by Gosbank on a
date agreed upon by the partners.' 5'
This method contains disadvantages in the imposition of an ad-
ministrative burden on the joint venture and the difficulty in valua-
tion of the Soviet contribution, typically real estate, machinery, or
technology, which can not be readily compared to world market
prices. 15 2 Even good faith efforts to establish reasonable values may
be difficult due to the lack of precedent and comparable assets on the
world market. Therefore, the meaning of world market prices
should be carefully negotiated and defined in the agreement.
The official Soviet exchange rate for convertible currency causes
a related problem.' 5 3 Because the foreign joint venture partner
most likely will contribute either foreign currency or assets valued in
foreign currency, the foreign partner is significantly prejudiced when
the contributions are converted to their ruble equivalent at the ex-
change rate set by the State Bank. The Soviets generally overvalue
the ruble greatly in comparison to convertible currencies. This re-
sults in an undervaluation of the foreign partner's contribution and
reduces the partner's fair share of profits.' 54 Standard valuation is
also important for goods purchased by the joint venture on the do-
mestic market as prices are determined by the State Committee on
prices based on policy directives issued by the Council of Minis-
ters. 155 Without insertion of standard valuation in the joint venture
149 See Pedersen, supra note 33, at 397-98.
150 Aronson, supra note 27, at 864.
151 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 12.
152 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 102.
153 The effective Soviet exchange rate fluctuated between 0.823 and 0.678 rubles per
dollar from 1972 to 1987. P. Cowrrr, 1986-1987 WORLD CURRENCY YEARBOOK 701, 706
(1989). In addition to these commercial rates, the Soviet Union offers a special exchange
rate for non-commercial transactions, such as tourism. The ruble is significantly more
expensive on this exchange, presently averaging $1.650 per ruble.
154 Aronson, supra note 27, at 866.
155 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 39-40.
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agreement, the profits accruing to the foreign partner could be de-
termined arbitrarily by Soviet bureaucrats.
Standard valuation should also include import substitutes pro-
duced by the joint venture. Standard pricing is particularly impor-
tant with respect to import substitutes produced by the joint
ventures, because prices in the Soviet Union are determined by the
State Committee on prices.' 5 6 Standard valuation requires adjust-
ment in the Central Plan, and could thus incur some resistance. 157 It
has been suggested that prices should be fixed in terms of foreign
hard currency158 and then be converted to rubles for Soviet account-
ing purposes. 159 Domestic sales to the FTOs would then be made in
convertible currency and the FTOs would sell the products on the
domestic market for rubles, which then could be maintained in con-
vertible currency accounts.
g. Dispute Resolution
Disputes between joint ventures and State organizations, or be-
tween the partners, can be resolved either by Soviet courts or by ar-
bitration. Ordinarily, disputes between Soviet state organizations
are settled in the State Arbitrazh, a combined court and administrative
agency that adjudicates according to the Central Plan. 160 Given its
orientation toward state interests and its commitment to protect the
Central Plan, 1 1 the Arbitrazh is not suitable from the Western part-
ner's perspective.' 6 2 Instead, the agreement should provide for ar-
bitration to resolve these conflicts.' 6 3
The Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, with its in-
ternational reputation for competence and fairness,' 6 4 may prove to
be an effective arbitration tribunal. An alternative is arbitration by a
neutral tribunal operating under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 16 5
Even though the agreement binds both parties to the decisions of the
156 1d
157 For a discussion of integration into Gosplan, see 0. IoFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note
14, at 108-09 and 158-59.
158 For a discussion of the value of the ruble as against other currencies and gold, see
P. Cowrrr, supra note 153, at 701-11.
159 Aronson, supra note 27, at 866-67.
160 Pedersen, supra note 33, at 398-99.
161 If the partners fail to stipulate the manner of settling disputes, the matter becomes
one for the Soviet courts. See Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 20.
162 Pedersen, supra note 33, at 433-34.
163 Partners should even stipulate a specific arbitration tribunal rather than merely
repeat the text of Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 20. USSR ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 76.
164 Pedersen, supra note 33, at 434-35.
165 In 1977 the American Arbitration Association and the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry agreed on a model contract clause on arbitration providing for settle-
ment of U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial disputes in Stockholm, Sweden. However, use of the
provision is optional. See Shillinglaw & Stein, supra note 14, at 18-19. For a discussion of
whether disputes should be settled by an arbitration tribunal in a third country, see USSR
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tribunal, it should include rules for enforcing the arbitration decision
against the Soviet partner. Because -arbitration is costly and time
consuming, the parties should provide for informal dispute resolu-
tion to resolve minor conflicts that may arise during the operation of
the joint venture. 16 6
C. Dissolution
Foreign joint venture partners should be particularly careful in
negotiating the dissolution of the joint venture. The Council of Min-
isters may liquidate ajoint venture if its operations are not in accord-
ance with'the objective outlined in the foundation documents.' 67
Because the law does not define the degree to which the joint ven-
ture would have to depart from its objective in order to trigger disso-
lution, thejoint venture agreement should provide for standards that
determine the objectives of the joint venture. The contract should
also define and limit the circumstances justifying termination by the
Soviet government. Arbitration should be required before the state
can dissolve the joint venture. The joint venture agreement must
provide the reasons for which the joint venture may be voluntarily
dissolved. 168
The joint venture law provides that the Soviet partners have a
preferential right to acquire the shares of the foreign partners.' 69
The shares can not be assigned to third parties without the permis-
sion of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of
Ministers and mutual agreement -of the joint venture partners. 17 0
Furthermore, the Soviet priority right to joint venture shares could
restrict foreign partners' profit maximization upon dissolution. The,
foreign joint venture partner should require a provision to prevent
the Soviet priority right from being used to force a sale of shares to
the Soviet partner at a lower price than would be available to a third
party."17  The agreement should also provide the foreign partner
with preferential, right to acquire the shares of the Soviet partners.
The Joint Venture Decree provides that upon dissolution or vol-
untary withdrawal the foreign partner is entitled to return of its con-
tribution in cash or in kind."72 The joint venture agreement should
provide for monetary return of contributions, and prevent the for-
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 77 (concluding "most rational" way to settle dis-
putes would be arbitration in the U.S.S.R.).
166 Pedersen, supra note 33, at 436. See 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, supra note 14, at 174-75
(Soviet labor law provides special procedures for settling labor disputes)..
167 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 51.
168 Id., paras. 7 & 8.
169 Id., para. 16.
170 Id.
171 Aronson, supra note 27, at 885-86.
172 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 52.
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eign partner from being forced to accept repayment in kind.' 7 3 The
joint venture agreement should ensure that the guarantee of repatri-
ation of profits in convertible currency is permitted irrespective of
the reason for terminating the joint venture.' 74
III. The Soviet Tax System
A. General Structure
Like those of most Eastern European countries, the Soviet tax
system is comparatively simple.' 75 Although some Soviet enter-
prises such as collective farms, cooperatives, and public organiza-
tions are technically separate from the state budget, 76 the means of
production belong to the state. This fact makes it redundant to tax
domestic entities. Similarly, the rejection of profit as an incentive
and the lack of wage differentiation makes it less important to subject
individuals to income taxation. However, the Soviet Union does tax
both domestic entities and individuals. 177
The turnover tax and the taxes on profits are the most important
taxes imposed on Soviet entities.1 78 The turnover tax is imposed
only once during production and, distribution. 179 The' applicable
rates are based on the product involved, the enterprise producing it,
and the jurisdiction in which that enterprise is located.' 80  Profits
173 Aronson, supra note.27, at 886.
174 Sherr, supra note 30, at 35.
175 See generally Kuiper, The Structure and Developments of Socialist Tax Law From a Western
Point of View, 39 BULL. Irr'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 484 (1985); 1-2 J. VAN HOORN & T.
NAGY, TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (1981); Stern, Taxation in East
European Countries, 20 EuR. TAX'N 106 (1980).
176 Some state enterprises subject to taxation operate on the principle of economic
hhozraschet and thus are considered independent entities with capital, assets, budget, and
accounts separate from the state budget. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
177 In 1983, 91.75% of the total state revenue of 357.9 billion rubles was derived from
taxes on state and nonstate enterprises while individual taxes accounted for only 9.25%.
M. NEwcrrY, TAXATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 48 (1986).
178 See, e.g., Regulation of the U.S.S.R. Council of-Ministers ofJune 30, 1975, "On the
Approval of Regulations on'the Turnover Tax," 1975 SP SSSR No. 17, item 108, at 330-
56; Instructions of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance of Dec. 31, 1975, printed in 9 BULL.
NORM. ART. MIN. & VED. SSR 12-32 (Sept. 1976); Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet of Mar. 1, 1979, "On the Income Tax on Cooperative and Public Organi-
zations," 1979 Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR No. 10, item 156, at 152-53; and Decree of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of Mar. 1, 1979, "On-Exemptions from the Income Tax on
Cooperative and Public Organizations," 1979 SP SSSR No. 7, item 40, at 161-64. To-
gether these taxes in 1983 accounted for 89% of total revenue from the taxation of enter-
prises. M. NEwcrrY, supra note 177, at 49.
179 The turnover tax is imposed on the receipts from sales of goods at the retail or
wholesale level. The tax also falls on monies awarded pursuant to judicial or arbitral deci-
sions over certain commercial disputes. M. NEwcrrY, supra note 177, at 50.
180 The products subject to the turnover tax include commodities and manufactured
goods, and the enterprises liable for payment include factories, industrial trading organi-
zations, and cooperatives. Id. at 52. Neither the Statute on Turnover Tax nor the joint
venture legislation indicates whether joint ventures are subject to this tax. See Howell, Tax
in the U.S.S.R.. The New Joint Venture Legislation, 15 TAx PLAN. INT'L REV. 7, 9 (1988) (sug-
gesting the turnover tax does not apply to joint ventures).
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generated by Soviet enterprises are channelled into the state budget
through what is ultimately a one hundred percent tax rate.' 8 l
The Soviet Union imposes two income taxes on Soviet individu-
als: 1) an income tax on the population, imposed on employees in
factories and offices, recipients of other earned wages 182 or royal-
ties,'8 3 and those engaged in professional practice;' 8 4 and 2) a tax on
bachelors, single citizens, and citizens with small families.' 8 5 Indi-
viduals are taxed both on their domestic and foreign source in-
come. '8 6 Additionally, local taxes are imposed under a 1981 Decree
on Local Taxes and Collections' 8 7 in three forms: 1) a tax on pos-
sessors of structures; 88 2) a tax on land;' 8 9 and 3) a tax on posses-
sors of means of transportation. 190 All three taxes apply to foreign
enterprises, and the first two to Soviet enterprises.
The Statute on the State Enterprises requires state enterprises
to make a payment for labor resources.'19 This payment reimburses
the state for job training, social and cultural opportunities, and other
public services for employees and members of their families. This
payment is not designated as a tax,' 9 2 and it is unclear whether it
181 Enterprises that operated separately were taxed originally at rates ranging from
10% to 81%. This system was amended in 1965 but has only been partially implemented.
M. NEwcrrY, supra note 177, at 53. Under the 1965 system the amount paid into the state
budget is the difference between planned profits and the amount of profits used for inter-
nal needs and purposes. The rate of the deduction from profits is the difference between
the amount of profits provided for in the joint venture's financial plan and the amount
used for expenditures. Id. at 53-54. This difference is paid into the state budget. Fifty per
cent of any profits in excess of this amount goes to the state budget, twenty-five per cent to
higher authorities, and the enterprise keeps the remaining twenty-five per cent until the
year-end reconciliation. At that time, the enterprise pays this latter amount into the state
budget. Id. at 54-55. For alternative means of taxation under this system, see id. at 55-59.
182 The maximum tax rate of 13% applies to income in excess of 100 rubles per
month. Income of less than 71 rubles is not taxable. Id. at 90.
183 The tax levied on royalties received within the Soviet Union varies between 1.5%
on income of less than 180 rubles to 13% on income in excess of 1200 rubles. Id. at 95.
184 Individuals in private professional practice are taxed at rates substantially higher.
On the first 300 rubles of income, the tax is only 15 rubles; the tax becomes 10% of
income between 300 and 7,000 rubles. On income in excess of 7,000 rubles, however, the
tax ranges from 14% to 69%. Id. at 102.
185 Single citizens and citizens with small families are taxed to encourage the growth
of families. The taxes range from 2.8% on income of 71 rubles per month to 6.0% on
income in excess of 90 rubles per month. Id. at 11. These rates apply only to employees
in factories and offices or to individuals treated as such. All other wage-earners are taxed
at a flat 6% tax rate. Id. at 112.
186 Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of Oct. 20, 1983,"On the
Income Tax on the Population," 1983 Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR No. 43, item 653, para. 5(5).
187 Decree of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of Jan. 26, 1981, "On Local Taxes and
Dues," 1981 Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR No. 5, item 121, at 83-90.
188 For a discussion of the tax on possessors of structures, see M. NEwcrrY, supra note
177, at 138-44.
189 For a discussion of the tax on land, see id. at 144-46.
190 For a discussion of the tax on possessors of means of transportation, see id. at 146-
51.
191 M. NEWCITY, supra note 177, at 67-68.
192 Id. at 67.
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applies to joint ventures. 193 The tax laws also impose a tax for the
use of basic assets.' 94 The tax consists of a percentage charge differ-
entiated by industry and is paid on the book value of each enter-
prise's capital assets other than natural resources. 195 The tax
provides an incentive to enterprises to economize the use of capital
assets. Finally, employers are required to make social insurance con-
tributions as a percentage of total wages including bonuses. The
percentage varies from industry to industry with fourteen percent
being the typical rate.' 96 Under this system, the employee pays no
social insurance.
B. Taxation of Foreign Entities
Although foreign entities had never been exempt from domestic
taxes, the Soviet Union generally did not tax foreign entities until
1978. Taxes were rarely assessed because the FTOs would establish
the applicable taxes after negotiation with the foreign entities, 97
often exempting foreign entities from taxation altogether. 198 In
1978 the Supreme Soviet adopted Decree 313199 under which the
Ministry of Finance on October 5, 1978, issued regulations, ending
the favorable tax status of foreign entities. 200
Decree 313 imposes a forty percent tax on foreign legal enti-
ties20 1 for income derived from economic activity in the Soviet
193 Note, Soviet Taxation of United States Businesses: State of the Law and Recommendations, 42
TAx LAw. 801, 818 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Soviet Taxation].
194 Basic assets include buildings, structures, transmission systems, power plants and
equipment, measuring instruments and control devices, means of transportation, and
other resources. Instructions from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance of Mar. 12, 1973, "On
the Procedures for the Remittance into the Budget of the Payment for Basic Production
Resources and Working Assets by Enterprises and Economic Organizations Transferred to
the New System of Planning and Economic Stimulation," BULL. NORM. AKT. MIN. & VED.
SSSR No. 10, para. 1; see also M. NEWCITY, supra note 177, at 56 (tax equals percentage of
non-depreciable value of assets, uninstalled equipment, and working assets not obtained
through bank loans).
195 M. NEwcrrv, supra note 177, at 55-57.
196 Id. at 67.
197 Id. at 174-75.
198 Id. at 175.
199 Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of May 17, 1978, "On the
Income Tax on Foreign Legal Entities and Individuals," Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR No. 20,
item 313, at 277-80 [hereinafter Decree 313], translated by Maguire & Stein, USSR: New
Income Tax on Foreign Legal Entities and Individuals, 9 TAx MGMT. INT'LJ. 3, 8 (1978). See also
Kuiper, U.S.S.R.: New Tax Rules Affecting Foreigners, 18 EUR. TAx'N 268 (1978); Leahy, The
New System of Taxation of Foreigners in the Soviet Union, 6 REV. SOCIALIST L. 85 (1980); Marti-
nez, Soviet Personal Taxation of Foreigners, '19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489 (1981).
200 Regulations of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 5, 1978, "On the Procedures for
Applying the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of May 12,
1978, on the Income Tax on Foreign Legal Entities and Individuals," No. 152 [hereinafter
Decree 313 Reg.], translated by Simons, Instruction on the Manner for Applying the Edict of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 12 May 1978, "On Income Tax from ForeignJuridical
and Natural Persons, "6 REV. SOCIALIST L. 85-100 (1980). See also Leahy, U.S.S.R. Instruction
Concerning the New System of Taxation of Foreigners, 19 EUR. Tx'N 6 (1979).
201 The regulations implementing Decree 313 define the term "foreign legal entity" to
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Union. "Income" is defined under Paragraph 11 (d) of Decree 313 as
"monetary sums received from the performance of work, rendering
of services, exploitation of copyrights, rights to inventions, industrial
designs, process or formulas and similar rights, and also from the
carrying out on the territory of the U.S.S.R., of other types of activity
authorized in accordance with the established order." 20 2
Foreign legal entities are exempt from income tax with respect
to the following types of income:
1. Amounts paid with respect to foreign trade transactions and
other agreements providing for importation of goods into the USSR
and the provision of services;
2. Amounts of interest paid with respect to bank accounts and
deposits in credit institutions in the USSR pursuant to credit agree-
ments and banking operations;
3. Amounts paid for the reproduction in the USSR of scientific
and other journals published abroad; •
4. Amounts paid for performances in the USSR by artistic,
musical and sporting groups and individual performers and athletes,
as well as for the production of performances, programs and engag-
ing in other entertainments and sporting activities.
20 3
Foreign legal entities may deduct business expenses related to
the activities conducted in the Soviet Union. 20 4 The Regulations
specifically allow the following deductions:
1. Expenses for raw materials used in'the production of goods
destined for sale in the USSR;
. 2. Expenses for payments of wages and other remuneration to
persons fulfilling orders for Soviet organizations, for the administra-
tion of the legal person, and to personnel of its representation in the
USSR;
3. Expenses for that part of research and development work
relating to the fulfillment of agreements with the USSR, as well as
advertising expenses;
4. Other production expensesincluding expenses for routine
repairs;
5. Non-production expenses, including transportation ex-
penses connected with the delivery of goods to the USSR.
20 5
include "a company, firm, corporation, enterprise, association, as well as other organiza-
tions established according to' the laws and rules of a foreign state." Decree 313 Reg.,
supra note 200, para. 3(a), discussed in M. NEwcrry, supra note 177, at 180-82.
202 It has been suggested that this definition of income lends itself to include income
from all listed activities even if conducted outside the Soviet Union. Maguire & Stein,
supra note 199, at 5.
203 Decree 313 Reg., supra note 200, para. 8. In addition, the regulations provide that
the Ministry of Finance, in consultation with other interested ministries or agencies, may
exempt other categories of income from taxation on a case-by-case basis. 'Id., para. 10.
204 Decree 313, supra note 199, para. 3. The Ministry of Finance may also consider
requests of taxpayers to deduct other expenses associated with the activities giving rise to
taxable income. Id., para. 16, discussed in M. NEWCITY, supra note 177, at 192-94.
205 Decree 313 Reg., supra note 200, para. 16. The Ministry of Finance may decide on
a case-by-case basis whether the taxpayer may deduct other expenses. Shillinglaw & Stein,
supra note 14, at 69.
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Decree 313 encourages Western countries to sign an agreement
with the Soviet Union, under which business and personal income
earned on the other signatory's territory are exempt from taxa-
tion. 20 6 Paragraphs 6 and 7 establish the rule of reciprocity in apply-
ing the Decree. These provisions allow the Soviets to vary the rates
at which foreign legal entities and individuals are taxed in the Soviet
Union in order to ensure that the income earned will be taxed at
rates comparable to those rates applied to the income of Soviet en-
terprises and individuals in the jurisdictions of the foreign entity or
individual. Paragraph 6 provides for the adjustment of tax rates on
foreign entities in the Soviet Union to match the tax rates applied in
the respective foreign state to similar categories of income of Soviet
enterprises and individuals. 20 7 Likewise, Paragraph 7 provides that
the taxation of foreign entities and individuals may be eliminated or
limited because of agreement between the Soviet Union and foreign
states. 208 In addition, Paragraph 7 provides that the taxes imposed
under Decree 313 may be lowered or eliminated with respect to tax-
payers of a foreign country when that foreign country has taken simi-
lar measures with respect to Soviet taxpayers. 20 9 The reciprocity
provisions are worded "may" and not "must. ' 2 10 Therefore, the
reciprocity treatment is subject to the discretion of the Ministry of
Finance. Although Soviet authorities reportedly211 have taken steps
to apply reciprocity treatment, it has not yet been put into effect. 212
Foreign entities in countries that have concluded a tax treaty
with the Soviet Union are not required to file tax returns with respect
to exempt income. 213 Otherwise, foreign legal entities are informed
in advance of the necessity of filing tax returns, 2 14 and the entity
must file its tax return for the previous calendar year with the Ad-
ministration of State Revenues of the Ministry of Finance by Febru-
ary 1.215 The Ministry of Finance or local fiscal authorities operating
on its behalf then calculate 2 16 and send a payment notice. The for-
eign entity must respond with proper payment either in rubles or
206 See infra notes 258-320 and accompanying text.
207 See M. NEwcrry, supra note 177, at 194-96.
208 Decree 313, supra note 199, para. 7.
209 Pending the completion of the France-U.S.S.R. Tax Treaty, infra note 258, France
lowered taxes on Soviet enterprises and individuals or exempted them from taxation alto-
gether. 2J. VAN HOORN & T. NAGY, supra note 175, at 119.
210 M. NEwcrrv, supra note 177, at 195.
211 Shillinglaw & Stein, supra note 14, at 68.
212 M. NEwcrry, supra note 177, at 196.
213 Some uncertainty remains, however, in light of the 1980 Soviet requirement that
U.S. and F.R.G. companies file tax returns even with no income to report. See M. NEWcrry,
supra note 177, at 200-01.
214 Decree 313 Reg., supra note 200, para. 14.
215 Id.
216 The Ministry of Finance may require a foreign entity and its representatives to
submit accounts, documents, and any other information required to calculate the tax due.
Decree 313, supra note 199, para. 23.
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foreign currency 21 7 to the Soviet State Bank no later than March
15.218 Late payment is penalized at the rate of 0.05% per day of the
assessed tax.2 19
Foreign taxpayers that disagree with the tax assessment may ap-
peal to the Minister of Finance within one year of payment.220 Never-
theless, the appellant must pay the determined tax on time.22' The
Ministry of Finance considers the appeal within three months and its
determination is final. 2 22
C. Taxation of Foreign Individuals
Foreign nationals residing in the Soviet Union are taxed on their
income earned in the Soviet Union "in the manner and the amounts
provided for by legislation of the U.S.S.R. for the impositions of in-
come tax on Soviet citizens." 223 The Soviet marginal tax rate is thir-
teen percent, giving a significant advantage to most foreign
nationals.2 24 Foreign employers, unlike domestic employers, are not
required to withhold income taxes, 225 but are assumed to be respon-
sible for payment of the tax.22 6 The regulations allow the payment
in rubles or in foreign currency at the option of the taxpayer, 227 but
it is unclear whether the taxes withheld from a foreigner whose sal-
ary is in foreign currency may receive payment in rubles.
If the foreigner is a resident of a country with which the Soviet
Union has signed a tax treaty, residency is determined in accordance
with the treaty.228 Otherwise, residency is determined under Soviet
law to include "citizen[s] of the relevant foreign state, regardless of
the actual place of residence or domicile of that person." 229 Decree
313 does not distinguish between foreign citizens who are perma-
nently in the Soviet Union and those who are temporarily in the So-
viet Union as both are subject to taxation on income earned in the
Soviet Union.230
D. Taxation of Joint Ventures
The Joint Venture Decree of January 13, 1987, included provi-
217 Id., para. 20.
218 Id., para. 18.
219 Id.
220 Id., para. 9.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id., para. 4.
224 M. NEWCrrY, supra note 177, at 231-32. This treatment also means that the princi-
ple of reciprocity may apply.
225 Shillinglaw & Stein, supra note 14, at 75.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
229 See M. NEWCITY, supra note 177, at 212.
230 Id. at 212-13.
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sions regarding the tax treatment of the joint venture. 23 1 The origi-
nal provisions were amended under the Decree adopted December
2, 1988.232 The distinction between equity joint ventures and coop-
erative joint ventures is important for tax purposes. 233 While for-
eigners participating in cooperatives are subject to taxation under
Decree 313, the joint venture and its foreign participants are subject
to taxation under the joint venture legislation.23 4
The joint venture legislation is far from clear in defining the tax
treatment of the joint venture and its participants. The tax rules
under Decree 49 are subtitled "Taxation of Joint Ventures." The
rules refer to the joint venture as the taxpayer and seem to indicate
that the joint venture is a separate taxpayer. The joint venture is,
however, not a corporate construction subject to double taxation. In-
stead, the joint venture is treated as a combination of a corporation
and a partnership. First, the income is not passed through to the
participants and may be accumulated in the joint venture. Second,
the income is taxed only once, in the hands of the partners generally
in accordance with their ownership in the joint venture. Whether
income distributed to foreign participants can be characterized as
dividends is questionable. If not so characterized, it would most
often be considered business income derived from a permanent es-
tablishment. However, some of the Soviet tax treaties specifically in-
clude profits of a Soviet joint venture as dividends under the tax
treaty. It is evident that the joint venture legislation does not ex-
pressly stipulate whether joint venture profits in general should be
considered dividends for domestic tax purposes. 235 This is impor-
tant, especially for the treaties that do not contain any provision con-
cerning dividends or do not specifically include joint venture profits
as dividends. 23 6 If the foreign taxpayer is not protected under a tax
treaty, the question becomes redundant since the income will be
taxed at the rates provided under the joint venture legislation.
Under the Decree a two year tax holiday is granted to joint ven-
tures. 23 7 The December 2, 1988, legislation extended the tax holi-
231 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, paras. 36-43. Pursuant to the joint venture
legislation, the Soviet Ministry of Finance issued regulations on May 4, 1987, as partially
amended on Nov. 30, 1987. See D. KELLEY &J. SAUL, supra note 40, at 64-66.
232 Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 45, issued pursuant to Decree 43, supra note
186, para. 43.
233 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
234 For a discussion of the Chinese counterpart to this legislation, see Li, China's Tax
System: An Evaluation, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 527, 546-48 (1989).
235 Kuiper, An East-West Model Tax Treaty: Is it Desirable?, 29 EUR. TAX'N 179, 179 (1989)
("[lt is questionable whether the distribution of profits by such an Eastern European joint
venture can indeed be considered a dividend, as it is generally assumed.").
236 See infra notes 281-94 and accompanying text.
237 Joint Venture Decree 49 originally provided, "Joint enterprises shall be exempt
from the payment of a tax on profit during the first two years of their activities." Joint
Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 36. According to this provision, the tax holiday
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day to three years for joint ventures in the Soviet Far East.2 38 After
the tax holiday expires, joint ventures are taxed at a flat rate of thirty
percent on taxable income, minus deductions.239 For joint ventures
located in the Soviet Far East, the tax is lowered to ten percent.2 40
Deductions are allowed for the reinvestment of income into reserve
funds or other funds established in the foundation documents for
the development of production and technology.24' If the income is
distributed abroad, the foreign joint venture partner is assessed a
twenty percent surtax.242 However, the Ministry of Finance is au-
thorized to lower the tax, or completely exempt individual joint ven-
tures from taxation. 243
ran from the date of registration of the joint venture, lasting two years after the operations
had begun. Thus, a joint venture with no taxable income in its first two years could not
take advantage of the tax holiday. By contrast, the three-year tax holiday for joint ventures
located in the Soviet Far East extended to "three years after [a joint venture] receive[d]
declared profit." Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31; as construed by Osakwe, supra note 2,
at 108 (citing Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 41, at 18-19 (1987)). This tax holiday, there-
fore, ran from the moment the joint venture declared its first profits. Decree 49 was
amended to extend the tax holiday to two years "after receipt of a declared profit." In-
struction No. 226 of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance of Nov. 30, 1987, "On Partial
Amendment of the Taxation of Joint Ventures."
238 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31. The Decree created a special investment
zone in the Soviet Far East to compete with Hong Kong for investments in undeveloped
areas and the Pacific Rim. See Patterson, U.S.S.R.: New Changes to Investment Laws in the
U.S.S.R., 16 TAx PLAN. INT'L REV. 46, 47 (1989). Hungary and China have created similar
economic zones. See Eichmannn, supra note 5, at 279-82, and Gelatt, supra note 40, at 244
n.90.
239 Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 36. The joint venture regulations
lack guidelines for determining net income, however. It is presumed that the deductions
allowed under Decree 313 also apply in determining net income of the joint ventures. See
U.S.S.R: Some TaxAspects of Soviet Joint Venture Law, 27 EUR. TAX'N 161, 162 (1987). The
Joint Venture Tax Regulation provides that taxable income equals the difference between
the balance profits and deductions into all the funds formed with the joint venture. Joint
ventures receive deductions both for these payments to reserve funds, as well as for pay-
ments to the national budget for state insurance of Soviet and foreign employees and for
pensions of Soviet employees. Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 49. See USSR
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 109.
240 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 31.
241 The law requires both 1) the transfer of profits to reserve funds until this amount
reaches 25% of the registered capital, and 2) if required in the foundation documents,
transfers to the funds covering research and development, improvement of production,
and acquisition of technology. Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 232, para. 6. Though
transferred funds are deductible, the amount of these annual deductions must be stipu-
lated in the foundation documents. Id.
242 The Soviet Union is the only Eastern European country that imposes a repatriation
tax. Other Eastern European joint venture tax rates include those of Bulgaria, at 30% or
40%; Czechoslovakia, at 20% or 40%; Hungary, at 40%6 or 50%; Poland, at 40%;
Romania, at 30%; and Yugoslavia, at 10%. Albeseder, Ve sei, & Woyszycki, Corporate Tax
Developments in COMECON Countries of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, 17 TAx PLAN. INT'L REV.
19, 19-23 (1990).
243 Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 232, para. 16; see Decree 1405, supra note 43,
para. 32 (also permitting Ministry of Finance to reduce income tax rates and taxes on
profits transferred abroad). To obtain an exemption, the joint venture must submit an
application and a calculation of taxes to its local finance body and substantiate the need for
the exemption. Id., para. 16.
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The procedures on assessment and payment of the thirty per-
cent income tax differ from the procedures uider Decree 313. The
joint venture assesses the tax due itself,2 4 4 which is subject to audit-
ing by the Ministry of Finance. 245 The tax is then paid in rubles24 6 in
four installments, due no later than fifteen days before the end of
each quarter. 24 7 Unpaid amounts from the calendar year must be
paid by April 1 of the following year.2 48 Late payments are penalized
at the rate of 0.05% per day of the assessed tax.249 The foreign dis-
tribution surtax of twenty percent25 0 is filed on a payment order,
along with application for the transfer of income abroad with the So-
viet Bank of Foreign Trade. 25 ' Neither the Joint Venture Decree nor
the Regulations require the taxpayer to pay the tax in foreign
currency. 2 52
The tax assessment is appealable to the local finance bodies in
the region where the joint venture is located.2 53 The joint venture
must pay its taxes pending the outcome of those appeals. 2 54 The
appeal must be made within one month of the date that the joint
venture is notified of the auditing results. 25 5 The local finance body
is required to pass judgment on the appeal within one month after
the appeal is filed.2 56 That decision may be appealed within one
month to the Ministry of Finance, whose decision is final. 25 7
244 Decree 1405, supra note 43, para. 9. The joint venture's accounting is governed by
Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, paras. 44-46 and Instructional Circular No. 53-13-
09 of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance and the U.S.S.R. Central Board of Statistics of Feb.
27, 1987, "On Accounting and Book-Keeping Procedures in joint Ventures, International
Amalgamation and Organisations Set up in the Soviet Territory." The rules provide that
the joint venture shall keep operational bookkeeping and statistical records in accordance
with the rules prescribed for state-owned enterprises. These accounting principles differ
from Western principles in that their purpose is to provide statistical information for state
planning. Therefore, the Soviets are studying the prospect of bringing their rules in com-
pliance with Western accounting principles. Because of these differing purposes, foreign
participants may want to establish an auditing commission in the foundation documents.
USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 110-11.
245 Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 232, paras. 17-18.
246 Id., para. 10.
247 Id., para. 7.
248 Id., para. 8.
249 Id., para. 11.
250 Id., para. 12.
251 Id., para. 13.
252 Id., paras. 12-14. The procedure for paying the repatriation tax implies the tax
must be paid in foreign currency. Note, Soviet Taxation, supra note 193, at 812. The Joint
Venture Tax Regulation provides that the foreign participant must file a money order to
the Soviet budget in the currency of transfer. Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 232,
para. 13, discussed in USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 105.
253 Joint Venture Tax Reg., supra note 232, para. 19.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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E. Double Tax Treaties
The Soviet attitude towards trade with the West is reflected by
the tax treaties now in effect. Until 1980, the Soviet Union had
signed only two tax treaties with Western countries; today seventeen
tax treaties are in force and others are pending.2 5 8
1. Taxes Covered
The scope of the Soviet tax treaties are of three different types.
The first type is illustrated by the treaty with the United States which
briefly states that "taxes and dues provided for by All-Union legisla-
tion" 25 9 are covered under the treaty. The tax treaties with Den-
mark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden are far
258 The Soviet Union has signed the following tax treaties: Convention for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation, June 20, 1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No.8225
[hereinafter U.S.-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Feb. 15,
1980, Norway-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp. July 1988) [hereinafter
Norway-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Apr. 10, 1981, Aus-
tria-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 25 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp. May 1985) [hereinafter Austria-
U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 13, 1981, Sweden-
U.S.S.R., reprinted in 25 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp.Jan. 1985) [hereinafter Sweden-U.S.S.R.];
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Nov. 24, 1981, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., re-
printed in 28 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp.July 1988) [hereinafter F.R.G.-U.S.S.R.]; Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Feb. 26, 1985, Italy-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 29 EUR.
TAX'N sec. C (Supp. Jan. 1989) (not yet in force) [hereinafter Italy-U.S.S.R.]; Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 31, 1985, U.K.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 26 EUR.
TAX'N sec. C (Supp. May 1986) [hereinafter U.K.-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation, Oct: 29, 1982, Cyprus-U.S.S.R., Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR No. 40 (Oct.
5, 1983), item 600, at 647-56 [hereinafter Cyprus-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation, Mar. 1, 1985, Spain-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 27 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp.
Nov. 1987) [hereinafter Spain-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, Oct. 4, 1985, France-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 26 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp. June 1986)
(not yet in force) [hereinafter France-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, June 13, 1985, Canada-U.S.S.R., [hereinafter Canada-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Jan. 18, 1986, Japan-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 29 EUR.
TAX'N sec. C (Supp. Sep. 1989) [hereinafter Japan-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation, Oct. 21, 1986, Denmark-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 EUR. TAX'N sec.
C (Supp. May 1988) [hereinafter Denmark-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Sep. 5, 1986, Switzerland-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 EUR. TAx'N sec. C
(Supp. Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Switzerland-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Nov. 21, 1986, Netherlands-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 27 EUR. TAX'N sec. C
(Supp. July 1987) (not yet in force) [hereinafter Netherlands-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 31, 1987, Malaysia-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 EUR. TAX'N
sec. C (Supp. Sep. 1988) [hereinafter Malaysia-U.S.S.R.]; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Oct. 6, 1987, Finland-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp.
Sep. 1988) [hereinafter Finland-U.S.S.R.]. For a discussion of the role of socialist tax trea-
ties, see Debatin, The Role of Tax Treaties as an Instrument of Economic Cooperation between "Capi-
talist" and "Socialist" Countries, 39 BULL. INr'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 393 (1985), and
Kuiper, East-West Tax Treaties, 15 EUR. TAX'N 185 (1975). In addition the Soviet Union has
signed the COMECON (CMEA) Multilateral Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty for Indi-
viduals, May 27, 1977, reprinted in 25 EUR. TAX'N sec. C (Supp. Feb. 1985). The following
Eastern European countries are parties to the COMECON (CMEA) treaties: Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and
the Soviet Union.
259 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 1, para. I(b).
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more detailed and provide that "the income tax on foreign legal per-
sons, the income tax on the population, the agriculture tax, the tax
on the owners of buildings, the ground tax and the tax on the owners
of means of transportation" 260 are covered by the treaty. A third
approach is shown by the treaties with Finland, France, Italy, Malay-
sia, and the United Kingdom. This approach provides for coverage
of the income tax on foreign legal entities and "the population."'26'
The treaties with Finland and Malaysia were signed after the adop-
tion of the Soviet joint venture legislation and cover both the thirty
percent joint venture tax and the twenty percent repatriation tax.262
The Finnish treaty covers "the tax on profits from joint ventures de-
rived and transmitted abroad by foreign persons.'' 263 All tax treaties
include provisions which apply to identical or similar taxes imposed
after the signature of the treaty. 264 Consequently, the thirty percent
joint venture tax, imposed after most of the treaties were signed, is
covered under this provision of the treaty. The twenty percent repa-
triation tax is not an income tax, and it is questionable whether it
would qualify as an "identical or similar tax." This is especially true
for the French, Italian, and United Kingdom treaties. Yet, the trea-
ties provide protection in the form of nondiscrimination provisions
which generally are not limited to the taxes covered by the treaty.
2. Personal Scope
Treaties usually apply to persons who for tax purposes are resi-
dents of one or both of the contracting states.265 The Soviet joint
venture is not considered a taxable entity for tax purposes. Income
is not taxed at the entity level, instead it is taxed only once it is dis-
tributed to the joint venture participants. As a consequence, the par-
ticipants are covered under the personal scope of the treaty, but the
260 Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(b); F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 2, para. 1; Netherlands-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(b); Norway-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 1; Spain-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2(b);
Sweden-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(a).
261 Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 1(a); France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 2, para. l(a); Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(a); Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 2, para. l(b); U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(b).
262 See supra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.
263 Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. l(a)(3).
264 Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 2, para. 2; Cyprus-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; France-U.S.S.R.,
supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Italy-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Japan-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2;
Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Netherlands-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art.
2, para. 2; Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, para. 2; Spain-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 2, para. 3; Switzerland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 1, para. 2; U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 2, para. 2; U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 1, para. 2.
265 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 1.
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.o
question remains whether the joint venture is covered. 266 The an-
swer is generally that the joint venture is considered a permanent
establishment and, as such, is covered under the treaty.
3. Residency
Soviet law defines "resident" as a "citizen of the relevant foreign
state, regardless of the actual place of residence or domicile of that
person." 267 Decree 313 does not distinguish between foreign citi-
zens who are permanently in the Soviet Union and those who are
merely temporarily in the Soviet Union; 268 both are subject to taxa-
tion on income earned in the Soviet Union. The Soviet tax treaties
provide protection from these national rules. The residency provi-
sion under the U.S. tax treaty defines "resident" as a corporation
created or organized under the laws of the respective countries, or
an individual recognized as a resident for tax purposes in the respec-
tive countries.2 69 In contrast, the definitions of residency under the
other treaties are more in line with the OECD Model Tax Treaty of
1977. The Danish tax treaty considers these factors in determining
residency: 1) permanent home or center of vital interests; 2) habit-
ual abode; 3) citizenship; or 4) mutual agreement. 270 A corporation
is considered a resident of the state under which laws it was created,
or if it was created under the laws of neither state, it shall be deemed
to be a resident of the state in which its place of effective manage-
ment is situated.2 7'
4. Permanent Establishment
Under the treaties with the United States, Denmark, France, It-
aly, Norway, and Sweden, the permanent establishment is termed
"permanent representation, ' 272 while the Austrian treaty terms the
permanent establishment as a "representative agency." 273 There is
no substantive difference between the different terms. Under the
U.S. treaty a permanent establishment is defined narrowly to include
an office or representative bureau established by a resident of the
other contracting state.274 Most other Soviet tax treaties define per-
manent establishment as an agency, an office, or any other fixed
place of business through which a resident of a contracting state car-
266 Kuiper, supra note 235, at 183.
267 M. NEWCITY, supra note 177, at 212.
268 See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
269 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 2, paras. 3 & 4.
270 Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 1, para. 4.
271 Id., art. 1, paras. 2 & 5.
272 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4, para. 2; Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 5; France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4; Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4; Norway-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4; Sweden-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4.
273 Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4.
274 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4, para. 2(a).
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ries on business in the other contracting state.275 'Except for the U.S.
treaty, all Soviet tax treaties define the permanent establishment
negatively.276 The treaty includes a provision similar to Article 5(1)
of the OECD Model, under which residents shall not be deemed to
have a permanent establishment in the other contracting state
merely because the business is carried out through a broker, com-
mission agent, or any other agent of an independent status, provided
that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of business. Fur-
thermore, the fact that a resident controls or is controlled by a resi-
dent of the other contracting state is a reason for treating one of
them as a permanent establishment of the other.
5. Building Sites and Constructions
The Eastern European tax treaties generally provide favorable
tax treatment for building sites and constructions, 277 which under
the OECD Model are considered permanent establishments if they
exist for a period exceeding twelve months. The Soviet tax treaties
provide that building sites and constructions are considered perma-
nent establishments after eighteen, twenty-four or even thirty-six
months.278
6. Tax Treatment under the Soviet Tax Treaties
In comparison to the OECD Model, the Soviet tax treaties em-
phasize tax exemption rather than tax credit. This emphasis on ex-
emption stems from the reciprocity treatment which encourages
countries to sign agreements with the Soviets to exempt income
from source taxation. 279 The reciprocity approach benefitted the
Soviets since Eastern investments in the West were more common
than Western investments in the East. 28 0
a. Dividends - Is Joint Venture Income Included?
The Soviet joint venture is an entity whose income is taxed in
the hands of the participants. The joint venture is not treated as a
partnership where the income, gain, or loss is passed through to the
275 See 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 5, paras. I & 2 (similar
provisions).
276 Id., art. 5, para. 3.
277 See Kuiper, supra note 235, at 183.
278 E.g., Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4, para. 2 (twenty-four months); Den-
mark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 5, para. 4 (twenty-four months); Finland-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 4, para. 2 (thirty-six months); France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 4, para. 4
(twenty-four months); Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 6 (thirty-six months); Sweden-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 5, para. I (eighteen months); U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 5, para. 2(a) (twenty-four months); U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 3, para. 1(d)
(thirty-six months).
279 See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
280 Kuiper, supra note 235, at 179-80.
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partners, nor is it subject to double taxation as is true with a corpo-
rate structure.28 l Whether the income qualifies as dividends under
the treaty is questionable,2 82 unless the treaty includes the income as
dividends or the income is considered dividends under the laws of
the contracting state.283 Instead, the joint venture would most likely
be considered a permanent establishment, and the income derived
from the establishment would be taxed at the rate stipulated under
the domestic law of the country of source, with no ceiling on the
withholding tax. In the case of the Soviet joint venture, the foreigner
would be subject to the thirty percent joint venture tax.
Two of the Soviet tax treaties (the Finnish and Malaysian trea-
ties) were concluded after the adoption of joint venture legislation,
and the treatment ofjoint venture income is specifically addressed in
both treaties. For example, the treaty with Finland states:
The term "dividend," as used in this Article, means income
from shares or income from other rights, which is subjected to the
same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the
contracting States of which the legal person making distribution is a
resident. That term also means profits of a joint venture created under the
laws of the U.S.S.R. which are remitted from the U.S.S.R. and which belong
to a resident of Finland participating in the joint venture.28 4
The treaty with Malaysia similarly includes joint venture income
as "dividends." Unlike the Finnish treaty, this treaty does not pro-
vide exemption, but limits the Soviet withholding tax to fifteen
percent. 28 5
The remaining Soviet treaties were all concluded before the
adoption of the joint venture legislation and do not expressly include
joint venture income. The income may nevertheless be covered as
dividends if an interpretation of the treaty allows inclusion or the
income is characterized as dividends under domestic law. The Soviet
treaty with the United Kingdom, for example, contains this
definition:
The term "dividends" as used in the Article shall have the
meaning which it has under the taxation law of the Contracting State
which the person (in case of the United Kingdom, the company) pay-
ing the dividend is a resident and shall include any item which is
treated under that law as a dividend or distribution. 286
281 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
282 The 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention defines dividends as
income from shares or "jouissance" rights, mining shares, founder's shares
or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as in-
come from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation
treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the com-
pany making the distribution is a resident.
1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 10, para. 3.
283 Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2.
284 Id., art. 9, para. 3 (emphasis added).
285 Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 2.
286 Most of the Soviet treaties, however, follow an approach similar to the Denmark-
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This treaty refers to domestic law for the classification of joint
venture income. Despite the fact that Soviet law does not expressly
declare that the income derived from the joint venture is dividends,
the legal framework indicates that the income should be considered
dividends. 287
The USSR Academy of Sciences deals with the problem indi-
rectly; "[w]ith respect to the tax payments of a joint venture interna-
tional agreements may provide for exemptions regarding ... the
income tax of a.joint venture itself."288 This reference would make
little sense unless the income is considered dividends. Otherwise,
the income most often would be profits derived from carrying on
business through a permanent establishment, which generally would
not be granted exemption. At the same time, the provisions con-
tained under Finnish and Malaysian tax treaties evidence that legisla-
tors and negotiators consider the joint venture income to be
dividends. If the income is not generally considered dividends, the
door would have been opened to extensive treaty shopping resulting
in virtually all Soviet joint ventures being set up with Malaysian and
Finnish intermediaries as the foreign partner.289
As the tax treaties with the United States and Switzerland do not
contain any provision concerning dividends, income earned by U.S.
or Swiss participants in Soviet joint ventures receives no relief from
the thirty percent joint venture tax.290 However, these taxpayers will
escape the repatriation tax by arguing that the tax is discrimina-
tory. 2 9 1 In contrast, all other Soviet tax treaties contain rules on div-
idends and protection against both the joint venture tax and the
repatriation tax.
U.S.S.R. treaty, which is more in line with the OECD Model: "The term 'dividends', as
used in this Article, means income from shares, participations or other similar rights,
which for taxation purposes are treated as income from shares according to the laws of the
Contracting State of which the person making the distribution is resident." Denmark-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 2; cf 1977 Model Income Tax Convention, supra note
282.
287 Decree 49 section 41 provides that: "Unless provided otherwise by a treaty between the
USSR and the respective foreign state, the portion of the profit due to a foreign participant of a
joint venture shall, when transferred abroad, be levied with a tax in the amount of 20%."
Joint Venture Decree 49, supra note 40, para. 41 (emphasis added). The provision that can
"provide otherwise" however, would not be the provision on dividends since the repatria-
tion tax is not an income tax. The dividents provision, rather, "provides otherwise" to the
provisions prohibiting discriminatory tax treatment.
288 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 46, at 107.
289 For example, on joint venture income, a Danish partner would face taxation with
no reduced ceiling, while her Finnish counterpart would be exempt from all such taxation.
This encourages the Danish partner to organize a Finnish subsidiary as the joint venture
partner. The tax treaties do not specifically prevent this type of treaty shopping. For a
discussion of this problem, see Weizman, Treaty Shopping: Do Viable Prevention Methods Ex-
ist?, 4 J. STRATEGY INT'L TAX'N 191 (1989).
290 See supra notes 239-42.
291 See generally Weizman, Taxation of Soviet Joint Ventures: Discriminatory Tax Treatment?,
17 TAx PLAN. INT'L REV. 31 (1990).
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 15
According to Article 10 of the OECD Model, dividends may be
taxed in both states, but the tax rate in the country of source may not
exceed fifteen percent, or five percent in the case of "substantial
holding." While the treaties with Austria, Cyprus, Finland, and the
United Kingdom all provide exemption for dividends,2 92 the other
Soviet tax treaties allow source country taxation.2 93 None of the So-
viet treaties contain a "substantial holding" provision similar to the
OECD Model. 2 94 The treaties, except for those with the United
States and Switzerland, define the term "dividends" in terms similar
to Article 10 of the OECD Model.
b. Interest
According to the OECD Model interest income can be taxed in
the source country, but the tax cannot exceed ten percent. The
Swiss tax treaty, unlike the U.S. treaty, does not contain any provi-
sion regarding interest. The U.S. tax treaty provides exemption for
interest. 295 This exemption, however, relates only to interest on
loans that are connected with the financing of U.S.S.R.-U.S. trade °296
The treaties with Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom also provide exemption for
interest, but the exemption applies to all interest income. 297 The
remaining treaties allow source country taxation: Canada (fifteen
percent), France (ten percent), Germany (fifteen percent), and Ma-
laysia (fifteen percent). 298 The term "interest" is defined in accord-
ance with Article 11 of the OECD Model. 299 The Canada-U.S.S.R.
treaty limits the source country taxation to a fifteen percent tax rate
292 Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 1; Cyprus-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 7, para. 1; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 1; U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 8, para. 1.
293 Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 2 (15%); Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 8, para. I (15'b); France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2 (15%);
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2 (15%); Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8,
para. 1 (15%); Japan-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2 (15%); Malaysia-U.S.S.R.,
supra note 258, art. 9, para. 2 (15%); Netherlands-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2
(15%); Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 1 (20%); Spain-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 8, para. 1 (18%); Sweden-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 1 (15%).
294 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 10, para. 2(a).
295 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 3, para. I(g).
296 Id.
297 Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9; Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9,
para. I; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 1; Japan-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art.
8, para. i; Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 11; Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 11,
para. 1 (a); Spain-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9, para. 1; Sweden-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 9, para. 1; U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9, para. 1.
298 Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9, para. 1; France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 8, para. 1; F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 1; Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 11.
299 "Interest," as in the Denmark-U.S.S.R. treaty, for example, denotes income from
loans, bank deposits, Government loans, debt-claims, and any other income considered
interest under the laws of the contracting state of which the taxpayer is a resident. Den-
mark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9, para. 2.
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on gross interest.300 However, interest arising in a contracting state
is taxable only in the state of residency if it is paid: 1) to the govern-
ment of that other state; 2) to the central bank of that other state; or
3) in respect of a loan made, guaranteed, or ensured by the govern-
ment of the other state or public body.30 '
c. Royalties
The Soviet tax treaties define "royalty" in far greater detail than
Article 12(2) of the OECD Model.302 The general rule under the
OECD Model is that the source country, in the absence of permanent
establishment, can not tax royalties. Most of the tax treaties provide
exemption for royalties.303 The treaties with the following countries,
however, allow source country taxation: Canada (fifteen percent),Ja-
pan (ten percent), Malaysia (ten/fifteen percent), Spain (five per-
cent).304 Even though royalties paid to a Western licensor are
subject to Soviet withholding tax, this tax is usually borne by the So-
viet partner.
7. Elimination of Double Taxation
Because the Soviet tax treaties with the United States, Austria,
Cyprus, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland do not provide
for the elimination of double taxation,3 05 the method for elimination
of double taxation is to be determined under national law. While the
other Soviet tax treaties provide for the elimination of double taxa-
tion, they allow the Soviet Union to have the matter settled under
Soviet law.3 0 6
300 Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9, para. 2.
301 Id., art. 9, para. 3.
302 For example, the Denmark-U.S.S.R. treaty covers income of any kind derived from
the sale, use, or transfer of the rights to use the following: copyrights on scientific, artistic,
and literary works; inventions; rationalization plans; industrial designs and models; trade
marks and service marks; trade names; computer and calculator programs; means of sound
reproduction; audio and video tapes; films; and trade secrets, experience, and knowledge.
Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 2.
303 Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. 1; Cyprus-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 10, para. 1; Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 9, para, 1; France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 6, para. ; F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 9, para. 1; Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 5, para. 1; Netherlands-U.S.S.R.,
supra note 258, art. 9, para. 1; Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 5, para. 1; Sweden-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 7, para. i; Switzerland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 8, para. 1;
U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 10, para. 1; U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 3, para.
l(a).
304 Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 10, para. 2; Japan-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 9, para. 2(b); Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 11, para. 2; Spain-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 9, para. 1.
305 The 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention provides means for avoiding
double taxation, through either the credit method or the exemption method. 1977 OECD
Model Income Tax Convention, arts. 23A & 23B.
306 Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 17, para. 2; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 14, para. 1; France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 15, para. 5; F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note
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8. Nondiscri'ination
Nondiscrimination of foreign nationals with regard to tax treat-
ment3 0 7 is a requirement that is included in all Soviet tax treaties.30 8
The nondiscrimination provisions in Soviet. treaties differ signifi-
cantly from Article 24 of the OECD Model. Except for the treaties
with Norway and Italy,309 all treaties have'adopted the Soviet reci-
procity approach. Article 12 of the Norway-U.S.S.R. tax treaty
provides:
1. A.resident of a Contracting. State shall not be subjected in
the other Contracting State to taxes and duties which are other or
more burdensome than those to which nationals of that other State
in the same circumstances are subjected.
2. The jaxation of representation maintained by a resident of a
Contracting State in the other Contracting State shall not be less
favorable than the taxation of residents of that other State who carry
on the same activities.3 10
While the other provisions differ, Article 10 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
treaty contains the nondiscrimination provision that is most com-
monly used in the Soviet tax treaties:
1. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who is a resident
of the other Contracting State shall not be subjected in that other
Contracting State to more burdensome taxes than a citizen of that
other Contracting-State who is a resident thereof carrying on the
same activities.
2. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who is a resident
of the other Contracting State or a representation established by a
resident of the first Contracting State in the other Contracting State
shall not be subjected to more burdensome taxes than are generally
imposed in that State on citizens or representations of residents of
third States carrying on the same activities. However, this provision
shall not require a Contracting State to grant to citizens or represen-
tations of residents of the other Contracting State tax benefits
granted by special agreements to citizens or representations of a
third State.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall
258, art. 19, para. 2; Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 12(b); Japan-U.S.SR., supra note
258, art. 20; Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 21, para. 2; Netherlands-U.S.S.R., supra
note 258, art. 18, para. 2; Spain-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 16; U.K.-U.S.S.R., supra note
258, art. 20, para. 2.
307 Nondiscrimination treaty provisions ensure that each party refrains from imposing
a heavier tax burden on the other party's nationals. For a thorough discussion of discrimi-
natory tax treatment, see C. VAN RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW
(1986).
308 See Austria-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 14; Canada-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art.
17, para. 2; Cyprus-U.S.S.R., supra note'258, art. 23; Denmark-U.S.S.R., supra note 258,
art. 17; Finland-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 15; France-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 13;
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 20; Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 14; Japan-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 21; Malaysia-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 22; Norway-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 12; Netherlands-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9; U.K.-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 21; U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 9.
309 Italy-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 14; Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 12.
310 Norway-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 12, paras. 1-2.
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apply to taxes of any' kind imposed on the All-Union or Federal.
level, the, Republic or state level and on the local level.3 11
Paragraph 1 is the staidard provision that a citizen of one of the
contracting states who is a resident of the other contracting state will
not be subject in that other contracting state to more burdensome
taxes than a citizen of that other contracting state. Paragraph 2,
however, is Somewhat different than both the United States and
OECD Model Tax Treaties, -using as its test for nondiscrimination
the tax treatment of nationals or representations of third states,
rather than the treatment of nationals or representations of that
other state.
The Model Treaties prohibit one contracting -state from impos-
ing more burdensome taxes on the permanent establishments of the
other contracting state than it imposes on its own enterprises.3 1 2 In
negotiating the U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaty, this approach was considered
inappropriate because of the significant differences between business
enterprises and their taxation in the U.S.S.R. and the United
States.313 The same approach was followed in the U.S. treaties with
Poland and Romania, while the U.S. treaty with Hungary followed
the United States Model TaxTreaty.3 -1 4
A third approach, also adopting reciprocity, is embodied in the
treaties with Finland, Canada, and West Germany: Article 20 of the
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R. tax treaty provides:
A Contracting State shall not subject a person resident in the
other Contracting State to taxation which is higher or more burden-
some than that to which this State would subject a person who is a
resident of a third State with which no Convention for the avoidance
of double taxation has been concluded..3 15
These nondiscrimination provisions depart somewhat from the
OECD Model and other treaties in providing that a contracting state
may not impose on the residents of the other contracting state more
burdensome taxation than it imposes on the residents of a third state
with which it has not concluded a double taxation treaty. Other trea-
ties apply a principle of reciprocity to the tax treatment of residents
or citizens who do not maintain representations in the other con-
tracting state, and the principle of third state taxation to those resi-
dents or citizens who do not maintain representations there. The
treaty with Germany applies the third state taxation principle to all
residents, regardless of whether or.not they maintain a representa-
tion in the other contracting state.
Applying the principles of nondiscrimination in countries that
311 U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art: 10, paras. 1-3.
312 See 1977 Model Income Tax Convention, art. 24, para. 4.
313 M. NEwcrry, supra note 177, at 295.
314 Id.
S5 F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 20.
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mandate state ownership of the means of production is difficult since
discriminatory tax treatment is determined by comparing the treat-
ment of domestic taxpayers to the treatment of foreign taxpayers.
However, in the case of the Soviet Union, domestic entities are inte-
grated into the state and the income is channelled into the state
budget, thereby giving rise to what is ultimately equivalent to a one
hundred percent tax rate. This appears to give the Soviet govern-
ment a free hand with respect to the tax rates levied on foreign enti-
ties. In addition, the OECD Commentary provides that
discrimination can be justified where a state provides favorable taxa-
tion to its own public bodies and services that are integral parts of
the state.3 16 However, this exception does not apply to state enter-
prises carrying on gainful undertaking. 31 7 Therefore, the Soviet
Union is prohibited from subjecting foreign residents, whether indi-
viduals, entities, or joint venture partners, to discriminatory tax
treatment. This would apply, for example, to a repatriation tax that
must be levied both on foreign and domestic residents in order to
comply with the nondiscrimination requirement.3 18 In addition, the
OECD Commentary provides that when a tax is imposed on both
nationals and foreigners in the same circumstances, the basis and
methods of assessment must also be the same.319 This should pre-
vent the Soviet government from requiring foreign individuals or en-
tities to pay their taxes in hard currency. The key factors when
applying nondiscrimination is whether different tax treatment is pro-
vided for taxpayers "in same circumstances." The OECD Commen-
tary indicates that the taxpayers are in the same circumstances if they
are in substantially similar circumstances, both in law and in fact,
under the country's laws and regulations.3 20
IV. Western Tax Treatment
The Western treatment of the joint venture and its participants
is important for, the Soviet government's ability to attract Western
investments and achieve the goals of perestroika. Western tax laws
often discriminate against Soviet joint ventures, but by extending its
network of tax treaties the Soviet Union has reduced this treatment
significantly. However, certain Western tax measures remain unfa-
vorable. These measures are usually not aimed solely at investments
in joint ventures, nor are they aimed at participation in Eastern Euro-
pean joint ventures. While the tax treatment in Western countries
316 The 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 24, para. 7 commentary.
317 Id.
318 If a repatriation tax or remittance tax is to be levied on both foreign and domestic
taxpayers, it will take the form of a transfer tax. See, e.g., Weizman, supra note 291, at 32
(discussing the German Reichsfluchtsteuer).
319 The 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention, art. 24, para. 7 commentary.
320 Id., para. 3.
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differ, the following discussion focuses on the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) of 1986, and tax measures that are important for U.S.
investors.321
,4. Classifying the Joint Venture for Tax Purposes
As discussed above, the joint venture for Soviet tax purposes is
treated as a corporation whose income is taxable only in the hands of
the joint venture participants. 32 2 Classification as a corporation or a
partnership for Western tax purposes is important for many reasons,
as discussed below. While most developed countries classify foreign
entities largely in accordance with the foreign classification, a corpo-
ration does not exist for federal tax purposes in the United States,
unless the entity satisfies the following criteria provided for by the
Code: continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability,
and free transferability of interests. 32 3 In determining whether the
necessary legal relations have been established, foreign law is ap-
plied.3 24 At least three of the criteria must be present for an entity to
qualify as a corporation. 32 5 Like a partnership, the Soviet joint ven-
ture generally lacks continuity of life, because the joint venture
needs to be dissolved in the event of bankruptcy or exclusion of any
of the participants. However, the joint venture has limited liability
and will qualify as a corporation if it has both centralized manage-
ment or free transferability of interest. Because the qualification of
the joint venture is based on criteria that can be arranged to qualify it
as either a corporation or a partnership, 32 6 it is important that the
question is addressed in the process of negotiation and approval of
the foundation documents.
For a U.S. investor it is generally preferable that the joint ven-
ture be characterized as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. First,
321 Investments in a Soviet joint venture also raise a number of burdensome compli-
ance issues for a U.S. investor. See Patrick, A Review of U.S. Tax Laws Applicable to Cooperative
International Business Venture: What Distinctions Should be Made, 2 TAX NoTEs INT'L 306, 311-12
(1990). The question of compliance is especially burdensome for participants in countries
where entities are subject to an accounting system which serves central planning purposes.
See supra note 244.
322 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
323 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1990).
324 Id. 301.7701-1(c) (as amended by T.D. 7515, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,612 (1977)).
325 See Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1990). The requirement was established in Mor-
rissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), but in P.G. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
159 (1976), an entity was considered a partnership even though fewer than three of the
criteria were present.
326 In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9,002,052, a U.S. trust and exempt foundation organized a West
German Gesellschaft mit beschankter Haftung (G.m.b.H.) in accordance with German law.
The Internal Revenue Service had previously ruled that the company should be consid-
ered a partnership for tax purposes. However, in Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B. 408, the
Service ruled that a German G.m.b.H. should be classified as a corporation for U.S. tax
purposes. Both rulings indicate that the company was arranged to qualify as a partnership
or corporation.
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the U.S. investor would be able to avoid the many antideferral meas-
ures under U.S. tax law; second, this would allow the U.S. investor to
take advantage of a net operating. loss in the joint venture. This is
especially important since the net operating loss is completely unreg-
ulated under Soviet tax law, and the allowance of net operating
losses is at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance.
B. Organizing the Joint Venture
1. Inbound and Outbound Transfers
In some jurisdictions taxpayers are not taxed upon the removal
of assets from thejurisdiction, but in most countries outbound trans-
fers may be subject to taxation. The taxation of a U.S. corporation's
outbound and inbound transfers is governed by I.R.C. section 367,
which limits the extent to which a foreign corporation may claim
nonrecognition. The provision is mainly aimed at outbound trans-
fers and precludes nonrecognition where one of the principal pur-
poses of the transfer is tax avoidance. Of the different types of
transfers covered by I.R.C. section 367(a), the reference to I.R.C.
section 351, which provides nonrecognition for direct transfer of
property to a foreign corporation, is the type of transfer most impor-
tant for U.S. participation in Eastern European joint ventures.3 27
Whether such transfers are subject to recognition for the U.S. par-
ticipant depends initially on whether the transaction has tax avoid-
ance potential.3 28 The transaction needs to have only tax avoidance
as "one of its principal purposes." 329 The transfer may nevertheless
be subject to taxation if the transferred property consists of "tainted
assets," which include inventory, accounts receivable, installment
obligations, stock, and securities.330 In the event such property is
transferred, a toll charge is imposed equivalent to the income related
to the tainted assets. 33' Even though the assets subject to the toll
charge are essentially "liquid or passive investment assets," it is not
unlikely that the U.S. participant would fund the joint venture with
such assets. In this event the participants should be aware that trans-
ferred assets may be tainted.
327 In addition, I.R.C. § 367(a) covers the complete liquidation of a foreign subsidiary
(see I.R.C. § 332 (1990)) and the acquisition of stock in a domestic corporation's asseis by a
foreign corporation in a qualified reorganization (see I.R.C. § 354 (1990)). 1.R.C. § 367(a)
(1990).
328 Previously, the taxpayer had to file a request for a ruling with the Service within
183 days of the transfer to achieve nonrecognition. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, tit. X, § 1042(e),
90 Stat. 1634, 1834 (repealed 1988).
329 The standards applied are set forth in Rev. Proc.. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
330 Id.
331 Id.
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2. Transfer of Intangible Property
Because perestroika seeks to attract Western technology to the So-
viet Union, the assets transferred from the West are often in-
tangibles. In 1986, the United States enacted legislation that should
prevent loss of tax revenues, resulting from transfer or licensing to a
related foreign entity of intangibles developed by expenses deducti-
ble in the United States.33 2 A new attribution standard was adopted
under I.R.C. section 367(d), which provides that the income earned
by a foreign entity from the use of intangibles transferred or licensed
to it by a related U.S. corporation transfers substantially all rights to
intangible property to a foreign entity.333 The corporation will then
be deemed to have received U.S. source income equivalent to the
income attributable to the intangible property transferred.33 4
3. Debt Financing
Soviet joint ventures may be funded with a combination of debt
and equity. Similar to the "earnings-stripping" provision33 5 for sub-
sidiaries-in the United States, U.S. corporation's outbound invest-
ment debts may result in treating the interest payment as
nondeductible 'dividends. While the 'earnings-stripping provision
provides a safe harbor where the debt/equity ratio of the payor does
not exceed one and five-tenths (1.5) to one, 3 6 there is no similar
safe harbor for outbound investments. However, a number of cases
have recognized outbound investments using a five to one
debt/equity ratio.33 7
C. Accumulation of Joint Venture Income
The fact that certain countries disallow their residents from ac-
cumulating or sheltering income in foreign corporations is often
considered an unfavorable tax measure, and one-that may affect
Western participation in Soviet joint ventures. It is, however, advan-
tageous for taxpayers taxed on a current basis to arrange their for-
eign business operations through a joint venture, because by
arranging a fifty percent ownership in the joint venture, the taxpayer
would most often escape current taxation.
1. Taxation as a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC)
Foreign corporations controlled by residents are taxed on a cur-
rent basis in the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom,
332 See I.R.C. § 367(d) (1990).
333 See id. (d)(2)(A).334 See id. (d)(2)(C).
335 See I.R.C. § 1630) (1990).
336 Id. (j)(2)(A)(ii).
337 Patrick, supra note 321, at 308.
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Japan,338 and Australia (effective July 1990).33 9 While the extent and
types of income subject to this tax treatment differ, U.S. tax rules are
generally considered restrictive because they include as Subpart F
Income, not only passive income, but also certain types of business
income. The Soviet joint venture is taxed as a CFC, if the U.S. per-
son's share capital in the joint venture exceeds fifty percent.3 40 A
U.S. person34' is defined as a participant with a share capital of at
least ten percent.3 42 Various attribution rules make it impossible to
avoid the treatment by channelling the investment through foreign
subsidiaries. 343 The CFC treatment may be avoided only by struc-
turing the participation below the ownership subject to the taxation.
The U.S. participant may nevertheless be taxed on a current basis, if
the joint venture participation qualifies as a Foreign Personal Hold-
ing Company (FPHC)3 44 or is subject to the accumulated earnings
tax.345
2. Taxation as a Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC)
The PFIC is a tax measure used only in the United States. Even
though the PFIC provisions like the CFC provisions are directed at
deferral, the PFIC provisions apply to foreign corporations whose
passive income exceeds seventy-five percent, or to corporations over
fifty percent of whose assets are held for investment.3 46 Under these
rules, U.S. corporations may be subject to taxation even where there
is no U.S. control. In addition, the PFIC tax may be triggered to a
Soviet joint venture where its capital generates passive income
before it is an operating business.3 47 In order to avoid the taxation,
the joint venture would have to eliminate the asset test for the PFIC
classification.
338 For a thorough comparison see B. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOR-
EIGN CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1986).
339 See Krever, The Australian Controlled Foreign Company Attribution System, 1 TAx NOTES
INT'L 217, 217 (1989).
340 See I.R.C. § 957(a) (1990); Patrick, supra note 321, at 307.
341 Id. § 957(c).
342 Id. § 951(b).
343 See id. § 958.
344 In order to trigger the FPHC provisions, not more than five U.S. citizens or resi-
dents must own more than 50% of the value of the outstanding shares of a foreign corpo-
ration. Id. § 552(a)(2).
345 The accumulated earnings tax, a supplement to the ordinary income tax, is levied
on corporations formed to avoid "income tax with respect to its shareholders" by their
accumulation of earnings and profits instead of distribution of the same. Id. § 532(a). The
earnings tax is 27.5% on the first $100,000 and 38.5% on taxable income in excess of
$100,000. The earnings tax is, however, overridden by the FPHC provisions. Id. § 532(b).
346 Id. § 1296(a).
347 Patrick, supra note 321, at 310.
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3. Taxation as a Foreign Investment Company (FIC)
The FIC provision is likewise aimed at tax deferral.3 48 These
rules, however, apply to public owned foreign corporations 349 whose
investments are primarily made in foreign securities, typically mutual
funds. The U.S. shareholder in a PFIC is entitled to deferral at the
corporate level, but on the sale of the stock, the earnings and profits
generated by the FIC are treated as ordinary income to the extent
gain is recognized.3 50 To trigger FIC taxation, the U.S. shareholder
must own more than fifty percent of the voting stock in the invest-
ment company.35'
D. Consolidation
Though the Soviet joint venture is granted a two or three year
tax holiday,352 it may take longer than that before the joint venture is
profitable. A possible consolidation between the joint venture and
the joint venture participant would allow the participant to absorb a
net operating loss in the joint venture. While consolidation between
domestic and foreign corporations is disallowed in some jurisdic-
tions, it is allowed under Danish tax law. 353 For U.S. participants,
consolidation with foreign corporations is specifically disallowed. 35 4
E. Foreign Tax Credit
Almost all developed countries provide domestic relief from
double taxation either by taxing on a territorial basis, thereby pro-
viding exemption for foreign source income, or allowing taxes paid
on foreign income to be offset against domestic taxes. The United
States, on the other hand, taxes its residents and citizens on a world-
wide basis,3 55 and is among the few countries that limit and "pool"
the foreign taxes that can be used as credits against domestic
348 See I.R.C. § 1246 (1990).
349 See id. § 1246(b).
350 Id. § 1246(a)(1).
351 Id. § 1246(b)(2).
352 See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
353 The Danish Corporation Tax Act permits such consolidation provided the follow-
ing criteria are met: the foreign entity is classified as a corporation for Danish tax pur-
poses; the fiscal years for the parent and subsidiary are identical; and the domestic
corporation owns as much of the foreign corporation as is permitted under the laws of the
subsidiary's country of residence. Dik, Denmark: Taxation of Dividends Received by Resident
Companies from Foreign Subsidiaries, 25 EUR. TAX'N 187, 189-90 (1985) (discussing sec. 31 of
the Danish Corporation Tax Act). Since foreign law is generally applied in determining
whether an entity qualifies as a corporation in Denmark, the Soviet joint venture would
likely qualify as a corporation for Danish tax purposes. The Danish tax authorities further
require that the foreign subsidiary be subject to essentially the same taxation as in
Denmark.
354 I.R.C. § 1504(b)(3) (1990).
355 See id § 61.
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taxes.3 56 The credit that can be utilized by the U.S. taxpayer is sub-
ject to the overall foreign tax credit limitation, determined by the
ratio of foreign source to the effectively connected income generated
by the taxpayer. 357 In addition, I.R.C. section 904(d)(3) provides a
separate foreign tax credit calculation for dividends paid by each for-
eign corporation in which U.S. ownership exceeds fifty percent. The
limitation applies to income earned by a U.S. investment in a foreign
corporation directly or through a foreign subsidiary.358 As a result
U.S. joint venture participants will either pay a residual tax on the
joint venture's earnings or generate excess credits on income that
can not be averaged with other foreign source income subject to
lower taxation.3 59 If the U.S. joint venture participant is not subject
to the separate calculation, the foreign taxes may be "pooled" in the
general limitation basket, which would be included in the global
calculation.360
F. Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Qualification?
The FSC legislation is a tax measure that could work in favor of
the Soviet joint venture. The FSC was enacted to encourage U.S.
exportation through foreign corporations. 36 1 The legislation pro-
vides that the U.S. exporter is granted an exemption based on the
corporatiorn's export income. 362 The exemption generally amounts
to fifteen percent of the FSC's export income. Even though the So-
viet joint venture could qualify as a FSC, the jurisdiction in which the
FSC is organized must also qualify. 363 In order for a jurisdiction to
qualify it must have an acceptable exchange of information agree-
ment with the United States. 364 The qualifying countries are either
on the published FSC-list or the country may apply for permission to
organize FSCs within its jurisdiction. 365 Because the current U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Tax Treaty does not provide for exchange of information,
the Soviet Union will not qualify for FSC purposes.3 66 To attract the
FSC, the Soviet Union would also have to provide beneficial tax
356 The foreign tax credit limitation raises burdensome compliance issues for the U.S.
investor. One commentator concludes, "The most troublesome compliance issues that all
United States multinational businesses struggle with are found in the enormously ex-
panded labyrinth of foreign-source income restrictions." Mattson, U.S. Tax Law Impedes
U.S. Joint Ventures Abroad, 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 231, 233 (1990).
357 I.R.C. § 904(a) (1990).
358 See id. § 904(d)(3).
359 See Patrick, supra note 321, at 312.
360 Id. at 312-13.
361 Weizman, The Making of an Export Subsidy: DISCs and FSCs in Compliance with the
GATT, 12 WORLD COMPETITION L. & EcoN. REV. 57, 57-58, 69 (1989).
362 See I.R.C. § 921 (1990).
363 See id. § 922(a)(l)(A).
364 See id. § 922(a)(l)(D)(i).
365 For a list of the countries that have been certified for FSC purposes, see Weizman,
supra note 361, at 70 n.53.
366 The U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaty does not provide for exchange of information, but notifi-
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treatment for the FSC, since the FSCs are organized solely in coun-
tries which exempt the FSC from taxation. 367
G. Bilateral Taxation
For many years the United States has sought to prevent the use
of treaty shopping.3 68 The 1981 Draft United States Model Tax
Convention Article 16 contains an anti-abuse measure that disallows
third country residents from taking advantage of the tax treaty. 369
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Tax Treaty does not contain an anti-abuse provi-
sion, and such a provision would be unnecessary since this treaty
probably is the most unfavorable Soviet tax treaty. If the Soviet
Union were to follow the U.S. recommendations, and include anti-
abuse provisions in its tax treaties, it would subject the Soviet joint
venture to a treatment that would prevent third country residents
(including U.S. participants) from receiving treaty benefits for invest-
ments made through the Soviet joint venture, in countries whose
treaties with the U.S.S.R. include the abuse approach. To avoid this
the joint venture would have to prove that there is a business pur-
pose and substance behind the joint venture.
H. Sale of Equity in the Joint Venture
I.R.C. section 865(a) and (f) provide that the sale or exchange of
stock in a foreign corporation with less than eighty percent foreign
ownership is treated as U.S. source income, even if the corporation is
actively conducting business abroad. 370 Since U.S. taxpayers are in-
terested in income being classified as foreign source income, the
U.S. participant would achieve this only by owning more than eighty
percent of the share capital in the Soviet joint venture. However,
this could qualify the joint venture as a CFC, thereby subjecting gain
from the sale or exchange of the equity to taxation under I.R.C. sec-
tion 1248. This section provides that the gain is treated as ordinary
income rather than long-term capital gain. For I.R.C. section 1248
to apply, the corporation must have consitituted a CFC at some time
during the five year period preceding the disposition. 371
V. Conclusion
The sweeping changes in the internal policies of the communist
cation in the event new statutes within the scope of the treaty are adopted. See U.S.-
U.S.S.R., supra note 258, art. 12.
367 By 1987 almost 95% of all FSCs were organized in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Barba-
dos, and Jamaica. Weizman, supra note 361, at 71 n.64. For a list of countries that provide
special tax benefits for FSCs, see id. at 71 n.63.
368 See Weizman, supra note 289, at 194-97, 211-24.
369 Id. at 211-14.
370 I.R.C. § 865(f) (1990).
371 I.R.C. § 1248(a).
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world led to a shift in Soviet foreign trade policy. Soviet efforts to
join GATT, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank
are evidence of an acceptance of international trade and a desire to
integrate into the world economy. The Soviet Union was denied
GATF membership and observer status because the Soviet centrally
planned economic system is seen as incompatible with the free trade
principles of GAT. On the other hand, Hungary and Poland were
granted GATT accession despite their planned economies. It may
be argued that due to its immense size and political influence, the
Soviet Union poses a greater threat of disruption to GAT than
Hungary and Poland. The rejection of Soviet applications to join the
IMF and the World Bank are more puzzling. While the inconvertible
ruble would make membership in the IMF and the World Bank im-
practical, the equally inconvertible yuan did not preclude China from
becoming a member. If the Soviets make the ruble convertible as
planned by the beginning of the 1990s, further exclusion from the
IMF and the World Bank can no longer be justified.
The Soviet joint venture legislation has been criticized from an
economic and legal viewpoint. Some question the possibility of mak-
ing profits in a centrally planned economy. Also, the joint venture
legislation, based on the concept of negotiation, has been criticized
as incompatible with the Soviet law of state ownership. Yet, ques-
tions left unanswered by the joint venture legislation are generally
negotiable in the foundation document. One aspect that is not nego-
tiable is the risk of failure which the Soviet joint venture legislation
places squarely on the foreign joint venture partner. The ability of a
joint venture to accumulate foreign currency is key to the success of
the joint venture and the foreign partner because hard currency is
necessary to import needed technology and raw materials, to employ
non-Soviet employees, and to repatriate profits.
As the foreign investor's gain in access to the Soviet consumer
market conflicts with the Soviet government's interests in importing,
the joint venture legislation clearly favors the interests of the Soviet
Government. The FTOs' monopoly over foreign trade transactions
does not allow the joint venture to trade directly with Soviet enter-
prises or consumers. The currency problems, however, remain the
biggest obstacle for foreign investors. The inconvertible ruble
makes valuation and pricing impossible and subjects foreign part-
ners' profits to arbitrary determinations by Soviet bureaucrats. The
anticipated resolution of the foreign trade monopoly and the incon-
vertible ruble problems should remove the main obstacles to foreign
investors.
Like most Eastern European tax systems, the Soviet tax system is
comparatively simple. Although some enterprises are separate from
the state budget, by law the means of production belong to the state,
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thereby making it redundant to tax domestic entities. While taxation
of foreign entities appears important, until 1978 the Soviet Union
did not subject foreigners to domestic taxes. The principle of reci-
procity, shown in particular by Decree 313 Paragraphs 6 and 7, gov-
erns current Soviet taxation. Additionally, it is important to note
that the taxation of foreigners is also negotiable with the Soviet
Government.
The large number of income tax treaties signed by the Soviet
Union in the 1980s is added evidence of a change in Soviet attitude
towards the West. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, signed in the 1970s,
was characterized by being brief, and did not contain a provision
concerning dividends. The 1986 Swiss treaty is similar to the U.S.
treaty. This approach originally favored the United States because
Soviet investments in the United States outweighed U.S. investments
in the Soviet Union. Today, the treaty is viewed as unfavorable to
U.S. investors because the treaty does not provide an exemption for
dividend income. Therefore, U.S. participants in Soviet joint ven-
tures are subject to the thirty percent joint venture tax, but not the
twenty percent repatriation tax since this tax is discriminatory. A
British joint venture participant would escape taxation completely.
The renegotiating of a new tax treaty between the Soviet Union and
the United States must be cheered since it would clearly lead to im-
provements in the economic relations between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.
In the span of five years, perestroika has brought revolutionary
change to the Soviet Union. Once isolated from the world economy,
the Soviets, by seeking GATT membership, discussing the converti-
bility of the ruble, and unlocking the door to foreign investment,
have called for the world's .help in reviving its failing economy. The
joint venture legislation, while far from perfect, is the clearest signal
to date that Western investment is both welcomed and encouraged
with adequate protection under Soviet law. Investors are well ad-
vised to monitor the progress of perestroika in light of its influence
upon their financial success, and the Soviet Union is well advised to
monitor the influx of Western investments to ensure the political and
economic success of perestroika.
ADDENDUM
I. New Legislation on Taxation of Enterprises and Joint Ventures
1. Decrees of June 14, 1990
On June 14, 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted two decrees:
"On Taxation of Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations"
("Tax Decree" or "E.T.D."), and "On Procedure for Implementing
the Decree on Taxation of Enterprises, Associations, and Organiza-
tions." The decrees will affect the taxation of foreign companies and
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joint ventures with foreign participation. Most of the rules will take
effect primarily on January 1, 1991.
2. Profits Tax (Tax Decree Articles 1-8)
Taxpayers. The profits tax will be applied to "enterprises, as-
sociations, and organizations that operate on a cost-accounting basis,
have an independent balance sheet, and are juridical persons." 3 72
Included are foreign companies, joint ventures with foreign partici-
pation, and foreign branches of Soviet joint ventures with foreign
participation. While the effective date for most taxpayers is January
1, 1991, the profits tax became effective on July 1, 1990, for joint
ventures with foreign participation.
Tax Assessment. The profits tax will be computed on a worldwide
basis, and include income derived from sources within the U.S.S.R.,
on the continental shelf, and in the economic zones, as well as for-
eign source income. 3 73 The profits tax will be assessed on the basis
of "the sales or work or services, other material valuables, and in-
come from non-sales activities minus the sum of expenditures on
these operations. ' 3 74 Income from non-sales activities include in-
come derived from participation in joint ventures and leasing of
property, interest income, dividends, and other income not directly
related to the production and sale of products or performance of
services. In determining the taxable income from sales and services,
related expenditures and the turnover tax are deducted. The turno-
ver tax is determined in accordance with Articles 14-16 of the Tax
Decree, while deductible expenditures include cost of production or
performance of services, including material expenditures, amortiza-
tion for complete replacement of fixed assets, labor costs, state social
insurance, compulsory medical insurance, payments for compulsory
insurance on property, and interest on short-term bank credits,375
transfers to reserve funds and similar funds,3 7 6 and payments to re-
pair funds.3 7 7 The Tax Decree further provides that the enterprise
or joint venture may deduct thirty percent of its expenditures on en-
vironmental protection and research and development of new
technology.3 78
Tax Rates. The Tax Decree introduces a two-level tax system
under which profits will be subject to federal and local taxation. The
federal tax will be twenty-two percent, which amount will be paid
into the union budget, while the rate of the local tax will be deter-
372 E.T.D. art. 1(1)(a).
373 E.T.D. art. 2(5).
374 E.T.D. art. 2(1).
375 E.T.D. art. 3(1).
376 E.T.D. art. 2(4).
377 E.T.D. art. 3(1).
378 E.T.D. art. 6(l)(a), (b).
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mined under the laws of the Union and republics on the basis of
agreement. 379 The total of taxes on profits to be paid into the local
budgets will be limited to a maximum tax rate of twenty-three per-
cent.3 8 0 While the new forty-five percent rate will be applicable to
Soviet domestic enterprises and joint ventures in which the foreign
participation is less than thirty percent, the new tax law will retain
the current tax rate on joint ventures that are more than thirty per-
cent foreign owned.38' These joint ventures will furthermore be en-
titled to special tax deductions and to a new five-year net operating
loss carry-forward rule.
Excess Profits Tax. The Tax Decree introduces a new tax which
will subject joint ventures and Soviet domestic enterprises to a tax of
up to ninety percent of income considered to be "excess profits. '3 82
The term "excess profits" will be defined by the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers, presumably on an industry-by-industry basis.
Tax Holiday. The tax holiday which is currently applicable to
joint ventures will be restricted under Article 6 of the Tax Decree to
apply only to more than thirty percent foreign owned joint ventures
that are engaged in the production of material goods other than in
the mineral extraction and fishing industries. The new legislation
retains the current two year tax holiday, extended to three in the case
ofjoint ventures established in the Far East Economic Zone. 383 As is
the case under prior law, the tax holiday will begin to run from the
time the joint venture declares a profit.
Compliance and Payment. As under prior law, the Tax Decree re-
quires that taxable income and amoung of tax due be determined by
the taxpayer.38 4 Joint ventures with foreign participation, foreign
companies, and individuals must still file their tax returns by March
15 of the year following the taxable year. All taxpayers must make
advance payments equal to the amount of tax paid during the corre-
sponding period of the preceding year; such payments must gener-
ally be made by the 15th and 28th of each month in equal parts of
one-sixth of the quarterly profits tax, while joint ventures with for-
eign participation, foreign companies, and individuals must make
their advance payments quarterly, no later than the 15th of the last
month of the quarter.38 5 The profits tax may be paid in rubles or
foreign currency.38 6
379 E.T.D. art. 4(1), (2).
380 E.T.D. art. 4(2).
381 E.T.D. art. 5(1)(b).
382 E.T.D. art. 4(3).
383 E.T.D. art. 6(6)(a).
384 E.T.D. art. 8(1).
385 E.T.D. art. 8(4).
386 E.T.D. art. 8(5).
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3. Branch Profits Tax (Tax Decree Articles 9-13)
A foreign company that engages in commercial activities in the
Soviet Union through a branch or permanent establishment will be
subject to a thirty percent tax on profits. If it is not possible to deter-
mine the income derived by a branch or permanent establishment,
the net income may be considered to be fifteen percent of revenues
by agreement between the foreign company and the Union or repub-
lic.3 8 7 If a branch of a foreign company is paid in goods or property,
the branch profits tax will be based on a comparison of the contract
price, the price as set by Soviet exporting organizations, and world
market prices.388
All branches or permanent establishments of foreign companies
will be required to register with the local tax authorities where the
branch is located; registration must be made within a month after the
beginning of operations, and again one month before the branch
ceases to operate.
Foreign companies operating in the U.S.S.R. through a branch
must declare the branch's taxable income in a report filed with the
local tax authorities no later than April 15 of the year following the
accounting year.389 The report will be subject to annual auditing. If
the branch terminates its activities, the report must be presented
within a month after the date of termination. The foreign company
must then make a payment order on a form approved by the U.S.S.R.
Ministry of Finance. The tax is to be paid at the time specified by the
payment order, either in rubles or foreign currency.
4. Turnover Tax (Tax Decree Articles 14-16)
The turnover tax, equivalent to a value-added tax, will apply to
enterprises, associations, and organizations, including joint ventures
with foreign participation, foreign companies and individuals. Only
production and sale of goods are subject to the turnover tax. The
conditions governing the turnover tax and the tax rate are to be ext-
ablished by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
Article 16 of the Tax Decree exempts specified products, indus-
tries, and organizations from the turnover tax; it specifically provides
for a two year exemption starting from the date of the beginning of
operations for enterprises producing commodities from local raw
materials and wastes, provided that the value of the local materials
used in the production does not exceed twenty-five percent of the
total value of the commodity.3 9 0 In addition, companies manufactur-
ing mass production goods may retain up to thirty percent of the tax
387 E.T.D. art. 10(3).
388 E.T.D. art. 10(4).
389 E.T.D. art. 13(2).
390 E.T.D. art. 16(l)(a).
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on turnover resulting from an increase in their output compared
with the preceding period in accordance with procedures established
by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.39 '
5. Export and Import Tax (Tax Decree Articles 17-19)
Included in the Tax Decree is a new export-import tax, which
will apply to companies engaged in foreign trade activities. The tax
will be based on the difference between Western market prices and
Soviet prices, and will be calculated in rubles.
6. Tax on Resources Designated for Consumption (Tax Decree Articles
24-30)
The tax on resources designated for consumption will apply to
virtually all taxpayers, except foreign individuals and joint ventures
with foreign participation exceeding thirty percent.392 The phrase
"resources designated for consumption" includes all employee
wages, money payments, income on stock owned by an employee
collective, and the contributions of members of an employee collec-
tive to enterprise property. Certain specified taxpayers are ex-
empted from the tax.
The rate of the tax will be established annually by the Supreme
Soviet when approving the budget. The tax is to be paid quarterly in
accordance with the profits tax procedures in Article 5.
7. Income Tax (Tax Decree Articles 31-33)
Dividends and income of Soviet participants from joint ventures
will be subject to a flat fifteen percent tax.393 Dividends from state
securities are, however, exempt from taxation.3 94
The Tax Decree has retained the repatriation tax; foreigners will
be subject to a fifteen percent withholding tax upon the transfer of
income derived from participation in joint ventures. The new with-
holding tax is lower than the existing twenty percent rate.395 The
repatriation tax must still be paid in foreign currency, and will apply
"unless otherwise provided by international agreements of the
U.S.S.R. on tax matters. 3 96
The new Decrees provide that the taxes on dividends and repa-
triation are to be collected at the source, and that the payor will be
responsible as withholding agent.3 97 A foreign participant in a joint
391 E.T.D. art. 16(2).
392 E.T.D. art. 24.
393 E.T.D. art. 31(2).
394 E.T.D. art. 31(4).
395 E.T.D. art. 31(1).
396 E.T.D. art. 31(2).
397 E.T.D. art. 31(3).
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venture, and foreign companies who can claim protection under a
tax treaty, must submit a request for refund in accordance with pro-
cedures established by the Ministry of Finance.3 98 If the income has
been transferred abroad, the request must be submitted within one
year after the date of the transfer.
The new legislation also imposes a twenty percent tax rate on
interest, dividends, rents, and royalities paid to foreign recipients.3 99
Income from freight paid by foreign companies in connection with
international transportation will be taxed at a six percent tax rate. A
foreign recipient who can claim protection from these taxes under a
tax treaty must make a request similar to one made under Article 31.
Finally, Article 33 of the Tax Decree provides for a new seventy per-
cent entertainment tax, which became effective on July 1, 1990.
8. Special Provisions (Tax Decree Articles 34-35)
Article 34 will carry on the reciprocal approach of Soviet tax law,
providing that protection from Soviet taxes under the Tax Decree
can be claimed under a tax treaty to which the Soviet Union is a
party, or may be suspended or limited on a reciprocal basis when the
foreign country has instituted similar measures under which Soviet
companies' tax liability with respect to the same or equivalent taxes
is suspended or limited. The reciprocal taxation in the foreign coun-
try must be attested to by the tax authorities in the country in
question.
Article 35 will seek to eliminate double taxation. Relief is not
based on a credit system; instead, Article 35 provides that the
amount of profits or income derived from abroad will be included in
the income subject to Soviet taxation, and taxes on income derived
from foreign sources will then be deductible for purposes of calculat-
ing the income taxable in the U.S.S.R.
9. Compliance Rules (Tax Decree Articles 36-41)
The Tax Decree contains tough new enforcement measures and
penalties. Article 37 provides that the taxpaying company and its
"officials" will be responsible for compliance. If the taxpayer fails to
provide the accounts and balance sheet required, the taxpayer will be
subject to a fine of 110 percent of the tax calculated for the preced-
ing accounting period.400 . Failure properly to keep accounts or to
file on time will result in a penalty of ten percent of the tax owed. 40 1
In cases of concealment or understatement of income, the taxpayer
is subject to a fine of double the amount of taxes owed. A foreign
398 E.T.D. art. 31(5).
399 E.T.D. art. 32(1), (2).
400 E.T.D. art. 37(1).
401 E.T.D. art. 37(3).
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company with a Soviet branch or permanent establishment, which is
required to register with the local tax office but fails to do so, will be
treated as a tax evader and subjected to fines equal to double the
income generated by the enterprise. Officials responsible for the fil-
ing and accounting are subject to a penalty ranging from 100 to 300
rubles ($160 to $480) in cases of negligence. The officials are sub-
ject to imprisonment for up to two years or a fine from 200 to 1000
rubles in cases of intentional concealment or understatement of
income.40 2
II. New Legislation on Taxation of Individuals, Foreign Citizens, and
Stateless Persons
On April 23, 1990, the Decree "On the Income Tax Payable by
Citizens of the U.S.S.R., Foreign Citizens, and Individuals without
Citizenship" ("I.T.D.") was adopted, and on April 25, 1990, the pro-
cedural decree to implement the legislation was adopted by the
Supreme Soviet.
Taxpayers. The Decrees apply to Soviet and foreign nationals re-
siding in the U.S.S.R., as well as stateless persons with residency in
the U.S.S.R. The legislation provides that individuals residing in the
U.S.S.R. for more than 183 days out of the year are considered resi-
dents for tax purposes. 403
Taxable Income. While all types of income generally are included
in taxable income, the Decrees enumerate a number of exceptions as
well as deductions to offset gross income.40 4 The new Decrees intro-
duce a provision which provides relief from multiple taxation; it
states that the amounts of income taxes paid abroad are "calculated"
for purposes of determining the taxable income in the U.S.S.R., and
that the amount of tax owed to the U.S.S.R. cannot exceed the
amounts of taxes paid abroad.405 It appears from the language of
this provision that relief is provided on the basis of credit. Finally,
the legislation explains that if rules established in an "international
agreement" are contrary to the rules under the legislation then the
rules under the agreement will apply. 40 6
Tax Rates. The Decrees contain new tax rates for individuals.
The tax rates applying to individuals were previously based on vari-
ous sets of rules, depending on the type of income and the taxpayer's
marital status. The new legislation has retained this approach. The
basic tax rate is now imposed at a maximum of sixty percent for in-
come exceeding 3,000 rubles. The amount of income that can be
402 E.T.D. art. 37(6).
403 I.T.D. art. 1.
404 I.T.D. art. 3.
405 I.T.D. art. 5(2).
406 I.T.D. art. 6.
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earned tax-free has been increased from 70 rubles to 100 rubles.
Also, the new legislation retains the reciprocal approach with regard
to foreign citizens; it provides that the collection of taxes from for-
eign individuals may be limited on the basis of reciprocity in cases
where the same measures are in effect for Soviet citizens. 40 7
407 I.T.D. art 28(4).
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